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The Privatization of the Civil Commitment Process
and the State Action Doctrine: Have the Mentally III




Civil commitment constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty
that requires due process protection.' The Supreme Court has
recognized that a mentally ill person's interest in avoiding wrongful
deprivation of liberty is "almost uniquely compelling."' The degree
of interference with personal liberty that an individual suffers when
he is involuntarily hospitalized is essentially the same as the
deprivation of liberty that one suffers after conviction in a criminal
trial.3 Hence, civil commitments "present an extraordinary
possibility of abuse to individual liberty."4 Accordingly, both the
Supreme Court and other courts have universally recognized that a
state's ability to involuntarily hospitalize an allegedly mentally ill
individual is subject to limitations set forth by the substantive and
procedural components of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.5
1. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
2. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78 (1985).
3. Ughetto v. Acrish, 518 N.YS.2d 398, 402 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). Admittedly, a number
of courts have concluded that a civil commitment proceeding should not be equated with a
criminal prosecution. E.g., Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F2d 960, 974-75 (2d Cir. 1983);
Goetz v. Crosson, 967 F2d 29, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1992). However, the rationale for this conclusion
is not that the deprivations suffered by an individual subject to the civil commitment process
are less severe than those suffered by a convicted criminal defendant but that civil
commitment proceedings are less adversarial in nature because one of the purposes of
commitment is to provide mental health treatment that will benefit the subject of
commitment. See Goetz, 967 F2d at 34-35; Ughetto, 518 N.YS.2d at 403.
4. Spencer v. Lee, 864 F2d 1376, 1382 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Ripple, J. concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
5. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975); Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F2d
173, 178 (9th Cir. 1980); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 446-51 (D. Iowa 1976);
Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 514-17 (D. Neb. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F Supp.
378, 386-92 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp. at Eloise, 384 F Supp. 1085,
1092-98 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1084-103 (E.D. Wis. 1972),
vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated and enforced, 379 F. Supp. 1376
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Every state has a statute that authorizes the confinement of
mentally ill individuals.6 Very often, an allegedly mentally ill
person's involuntary hospitalization is effectuated when one or
more physicians certify that the individual requires hospitalization.7
Significantly, the conmitment laws of most states fail to distinguish
between certification by government and private physicians and
state commitment laws that authorize private physicians to deprive
mentally ill individuals of liberty by confining them in private
hospitals.8 However, "'most rights secured by the Constitution are
protected only against infringements by governments.' "9
Consequently, this leads to the rather significant issue of whether
there are two classes of individuals who are subject to the civil
commitment process: (1) those whom physicians commit to
government hospitals and whom the Constitution protects; and (2)
those whom physicians commit to private hospitals and hence, are
not protected by the Constitution.
The Supreme Court has recognized that in some instances the
conduct of private parties will be subject to the strictures of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 0  However, "the question whether
particular conduct is 'private,' on the one hand, or 'state action,' on
the other, frequently admits of no easy answer."" State action
litigation has generated an extensive amount of case law at the
Supreme Court, circuit court, and district court levels.' 2
Not surprisingly, once the Supreme Court and other courts
recognized that psychiatric hospitals could effectuate a person's
(1974), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated 413 F Supp. 1318 (E.D.
Wis. 1976).
6. Terri Keville, The Power to Confine: Private Involuntary Civil Commitment as
State Action, 19 N.E. J. CRim. & Civ. CONFINEMENT 61, 71 (1993); See also Samuel Jan Brakel,
John Parry, Barbara Weiner, The Mentally Disabled and the Law, 76-81, 101-26 (3rd ed. 1985)
(detailing state-by state commitment provisions).
7. See Brakel, Parry, Weiner, supra note 6 at 101-05, 159-60 (detailing state
commitment statutes that authorize confinement upon the certificates of one or more
physicians).
8. See, e.g., 405 ILL CoMP. STAT. ANN. 15/2 (Matthew Bender 2001); MASS ANN. LAWS ch.
123 § 12; N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.27, 9.37, 9.39 (McKinney 1996); 50 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. §
4404 (West 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-410 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TEX. HALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 573.022 (West 1992).
9. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) (quoting Flagg Bros. Inc. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1982)).
10. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1946); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461, 469-70 (1953).
11. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1974).
12. For a detailed summary of state action case law see Schwartz & Kirklin, Section
1983 Litigation: Claims, Defenses, and Fees, §§ 5.10-5.20 (3rd ed. 1997).
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involuntary hospitalization only pursuant to substantive and
procedural constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment, courts were
required to address the question of whether physicians who civilly
committed allegedly mentally ill individuals to private psychiatric
hospitals engaged in state action. Initially, most federal district
courts held that the physicians were state actors.13 However, in
1989, an en banc panel of the Seventh Circuit in held that civil
commitment does not constitute state action.14 Since Spencer,
seven other circuits have addressed this question and all have
concluded that physicians who involuntarily hospitalize an allegedly
mentally ill individual to a private hospital pursuant to a state's
civil commitment laws do not engage in state action." The upshot
of these cases is that thousands of individuals have been stripped
of federal Constittitional protection when they have. been
involuntarily hospitalized.'
6
This article will first briefly examine the impact of the
privatization movement on the process of psychiatric
hospitalization. The article will then address state action
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, followed by an examination
and comparison of district court and courts of appeals cases that
have addressed the issue of whether civil commitment constitutes
state action. Next, this article will analyze the issue at hand under
Supreme Court state action jurisprudence in general. The article
13. See Davenport v. Saint Mary Hosp., 633 F. Supp. 1228, 1237 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Plain v.
Flicker, 645 F. Supp. 898, 908 (D.N.J. 1986); Willacy v. Lewis, 598 F. Supp. 346, 349 (D.D.C.
1984); Brown v. Jenson, 572 F Supp. 193, 197 n.1 (D. Colo. 1983); Kay v. Benson, 472 F
Supp. 850, 851 (D.N.H. 1979); Ruffler v. Phelps Mem. Hosp., 453 F Supp. 1062, 1068-70
(S.D.N.Y 1978); but see Landry v. Odom, 559 F. Supp. 514 (E.D.La. 1983); Watkins v. Roche,
529 F Supp. 327 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
14. Spencer v. Lee, 864 F2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
15. Bass v. Parkwood Hosp., 180 F3d 234 (5th Cir. 1999); Okunieff v. Rosenberg, 166
F3d 507 (2d Cir. 1999), affg 996 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); S.P. v. City of Takoma Park,
Md., 134 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 1998); Pino v. Higgs, 75 F3d 1461 (10th Cir. 1996); Ellison v.
Garbarino, 48 F.3d 192 (6th Cir. 1995); Rockwell v. Cape Cod Hosp., 26 F.3d 254 (1st Cir.
1994); Janicsko v. Pellman, 774 F Supp. 331 (M.D. Pa. 1991), arfd. without opinion, 970 F2d
899 (3d Cir. 1992); Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127 (lth Cir. 1992). Only recently, did a
circuit court, based upon the facts in the particular case, hold that physicians who
involuntarily hospitalized a mentally ill person at a private psychiatric hospital were state
actors. Jensen v. Lane County, 222 E3d 579 (9th Cir. 2000).
16. In 1990, over 32,000 people were hospitalized in private psychiatric hospitals and
38,000 people were psychiatrically hospitalized in general hospitals. Center for Mental Health
Studies, Mental Health, United States 103 (1994). While not all such individuals were
involuntarily hospitalized, one can assume that a significant number of individuals were.
Likewise, these figures do not distinguish between private and public general hospitals.
Again, one can assume that a significant number of individuals were hospitalized at private
general hospitals.
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will detail why, based upon well-established Supreme Court state
action jurisprudence, it almost borders on the absurd to conclude
that civil commitment does not constitute state action. In so
arguing, this article will not, as some authorities have done, assert
that the present state action doctrine needs to be reformulated.17
Rather, this article accepts, as a given, the present state of
Supreme Court jurisprudence. To correct the present state of the
law, it is incumbent on the Supreme Court to address this issue, or
the circuit courts to reevaluate this issue, and hold that private
physicians who act under the authority of the state to involuntarily
hospitalize a mentally ill individual engage in state action.
18
I. THE PRIVATIZATION OF THE CIvIL COMMITMENT PROCESS
Over the last two decades, governments have moved to privatize
many traditional governmental activities such as tax collection, the
operation of prisons, the operation of hospitals, fire prevention and
dispute resolution.19 However, the greatest shift of traditionally
governmental activity from the public to private sector may have
occurred in the mental health area.
Over the last few decades, while psychiatric admissions to state
hospitals have decreased, non-government general hospitals have
become the primary site for in-patient psychiatric care.20 During
this period, there has been "unprecedented growth" in the number
of psychiatric hospitals, particularly those operated for profit.
21
17. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L REV. 503, 536
(1985); Michael J. Phillips, The Inevitable Incoherence of Modern State Action Doctrine, 28
ST. Louis U. L J. 683 (1984); Ronna Schneider, The 1982 State Action Trilogy: Doctrinal
Contraction Confusion, and a Proposal for Change, 60 NOTRE DAME L REV. 1150 (1985).
18. At times this article will cite with approval some of the district court cases in
which the court found state action. A critic can rightfully assert that it is inappropriate to
cite such authority when criticizing a line of cases that have overruled these decisions.
However, this article does not cite the holdings of these cases as much as the rationale
underlying some of the opinions. It is up to the reader to determine the extent to which the
rationale of the district courts is consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence. I believe that
it is.
19. See Paul Howard Morris, The Impact of Constitutional Liability on the
Privatization Movement After Richardson v. McKnight, 52 VAND. L REV. 489, 492-94 (1999).
20. John Petrila, Redefining Mental Health Law: Thoughts on a New Agenda, 16 LAw
HuMAN BEAV. 89, 91 (1992); Richard J. Goldberg and Barry S. Fogel, Integration of General
Hospital Psychiatric Services with Freestanding Private Psychiatric Hospitals, 40 HosP. &
Comm. PsYcn. 1057, 1057 (1989).
21. Goldberg & Fogel, supra note 20 at 1057. By 1994, 16 for-profit hospital chains
owned or managed 831 hospitals and staffed 121,385 beds. John Petrila, Ethics, Money, and
the Problem of Coercion in Managed Behavioral Health Care, 40 ST. Louis U. L J. 359, 362
n.10 (1996). This amounted to a 11.2% increase in the number of hospitals and a 5.6% in the
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Indeed, over a five-year period, the number of private psychiatric
hospitals in the United States more than doubled, increasing from
17,157 in 1983 to 42,615 in 1988.22 Presently, few states rely solely
on public institutions and "[w]hen psychiatric hospitalization does
occur, it is likely to be at a private psychiatric hospital or to a
psychiatric unit of a general hospital."2
3
An examination of mental health care in New York State
illustrates how the provision of psychiatric treatment is part of one
unified public-private partnership in which the state, local
governments, and private hospitals share responsibility for the care
and treatment of mentally ill individuals. Under New York law, the
State Office of Mental Health must plan and work with, inter alia,
local governments and public and private providers of psychiatric
services, including general hospitals, "to develop an effective,
integrated, comprehensive system for the delivery of all services to
the mentally ill."24
As part of this comprehensive plan, the State Office of Mental
Health has decreed "[clommunity-based general hospitals have a
greater role in acute care and are the providers of choice."25 Over
the last decade in New York, "psychiatric beds in local general
hospitals have increased by nearly 25%."26 Likewise, the State Office
of Mental Health has redefined the role of state facilities as
intermediate and long-term care hospitals.27 The State Office of
Mental Health has anticipated that its policies will result in the
"virtual elimination" of state involvement in the provision of acute
care in New York City.
28
In promulgating this cooperative effort, the New York Legislature
has required private hospitals to obtain an operating certificate as a
condition of providing psychiatric services.29 As a result of
number of beds over a one-year period. Id.
22. Gregg Timmons, Crisis in the Mental Health Care Industry: An Analysis of the
Practices of Private, For-Profit Psychiatric Hospitals and the Governmental Response, 31
HOUSTON L REV. 323, 325-26 (1994); see also Lynn Simons, Privatization and the Mental
Health System, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST, August 1989, 1138 (stating although
institutionalization resulted in a 75% decrease in state hospital beds, beds in private
psychiatric facilities more than tripled).
23. John Petrila, Redefining Mental Health Law, 16 LAw & HuMAN BEHAV. 89, 91 (1992).
24. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 1.03(5), 7.01 (McKinney's 1996).
25. Office of Mental Health, Statewide Comprehensive Plan for Mental Health Services
1993-1997 1 (October 1, 1992) ["Statewide Comprehensive Plan"] ("emphasis added").
26. Id. at 2.
27. Id. at 63.
28. Id. at 125.
29. N.Y. MENAL HYG. LAW § 31.02.
2001
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relatively recent changes in the law, when a hospital renews its
operating certificate, the State Office of Mental Health allows all
hospitals, public and private, to service a catchment, i.e.,
geographic area for involuntary psychiatric admissions. 30 Hence, as
a condition of providing in-patient psychiatric services, the state
allows general hospitals, public and private, to assume primary
responsibility for emergency psychiatric admissions, an activity that
the state would ordinarily assume.31
Moreover, the State Office of Mental Health has also undertaken
"several initiatives which are intended to achieve increased
participation of general hospitals in acute psychiatric care."32
Community based general hospitals receive financial incentives for
serving people with serious mental illness.3 This includes the
development of Medicaid rate methodologies designed to "increase
the number of patients treated."3 This use of Medicaid funds to
cover psychiatric care has been a significant factor in the shift of
the provision of acute psychiatry from state hospitals to other
types of facilities.3
5
The increase in private, for-profit hospitalization has resulted in
the proliferation of pernicious actions designed to increase the
profitability of hospitals. Psychiatric hospitals have lured
individuals into psychiatric treatment by instituting massive
advertising campaigns designed to promote the benefits of
treatment.36 However, once hospitalized, patients found it not so
easy to leave, at times facing intimidation from hospital staff when
they decided they no longer wanted to receive in-patient care and
treatment.3
7
Moreover, the attempts to increase revenue by private psychiatric
hospitals have not stopped with attempts to procure voluntary
admissions. Private hospitals seek to maintain certain census levels
on the wards.3 Some hospitals have used "bounty hunters" to
transport possible candidates for involuntary hospitalization. 39
30. Id. at §§ 9.39; 9.40.
31. See Id. at § 7.07.
32. Statewide Comprehensive Plan at 30.
33. Id. at 1.
34. Id. at 10.
35. See Petrila, supra note 21 at 371-72, n.27.
36. Timmons, supra note 22 at 328.
37. Id. at 336-37.
38. Peter Kerr, Paying for Fraud: Mental Hospital Chains Accused of Much Cheating
on Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, November 24, 1991, at Al.
39. Timmons, supra note 22 at 333-34; Peter Kerr, Psychiatry For Profit: Trouble at
Vol. 40:1
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Hospitals have based the length of a patient's confinement not on
the individual's clinical condition but on the length of insurance
coverage, discharging individuals when insurance has expired.40 Not
surprisingly, the emphasis on profits has resulted in private
hospitals admitting individuals who did not need in-patient
hospitalization.
41
Such abusive practices led, in one instance, to a settlement of a
civil action instituted by the Texas Attorney General in which a
hospital chain agreed not to pay school officials for referrals and
not reward employees based upon the number of patients
hospitalized. 42 While the settlement helped eliminate unsavory
practices in Texas, the problems resulting from actions of private
hospitals have been described as "national in scope."43
II. AN OVERVIEW OF SUPREME COURT STATE ACTION JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court detailed the limitations of the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment in The Civil Rights Cases," in which the
Court held that acts of private individuals unsupported by state
authority do not violate civil rights that the Constitution protects.
45
However, beginning in the 1920's, the Supreme Court began to
examine if, and under what circumstances, a court should attribute
actions of private individuals to the state. Accordingly, such
attribution makes applicable to the situation at hand both the First
Private Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES, October 22, 1991, at Al. Once they transported the civil
commitment candidate, bounty hunters received payment for their actions. Timmons, supra
note 22 at 333-34.
40. Tlimmons, supra note 22 at 335-36; Peter Kerr, Psychiatry For Profit: Trouble at
Private Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES, October 22, 1991, at Al; see also Peter Kerr, U.S. Study of
Mental Care Finds Widespread Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, April 29, 1992, at Dl (former hospital
employees testify before the House of Representatives of widespread practice of changing a
patient's diagnosis to be cured on the day insurance coverage expired); Peter Kerr,
Psychiatry For Profit: Trouble at Private Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES, October 22, 1991, at Al
(concession by doctor at one private hospital that the facility admitted people who did not
need treatment because their insurance covered in-patient care).
41. See Peter Kerr, U.S. Study of Mental Care Finds Widespread Abuses, N.Y. TIMES,
April 29, 1992, at Dl; Peter Kerr, Paying for Fraud: Mental Hospital Chains Accused of
Much Cheating on Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, November 24, 1991, at Section 1, page 1.
42. Peter Kerr, Mental Hospital Operator Settles Lawsuit with Texas, N.Y. TIMES, June
5, 1992, at D6.
43. Peter Kerr, U.S. Study of Mental Care Finds Widespread Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, April
29, 1992, at Dl.
44. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
45. 109 U.S. at 17. Prior to The Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court twice
recognized that the constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment applied only to the states and
not to private individuals. See Virginia v Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554-55 (1875).
2001
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and Fourteenth Amendments, constitutional provisions that, on
their face, apply only to the government. When the actions of
private individuals are attributable to the state, the individuals are
said to have engaged in state action.46 Since it began examining the
state action issue, the Supreme Court has analyzed the issue in
numerous contexts.
The many different contexts in which the Supreme Court has
been required to determine whether private individuals have
engaged in state action helps to explain why the state action
question can be complex and confusing.47 The first type of state
action case addressed the issue of whether the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits discriminatory
conduct by private political parties.48 The Court was next required
to examine whether private property had attributes that were
sufficiently similar to public property maintained by the
government as to provide constitutional protection for those
individuals who sought to exercise their First Amendment rights on
the private property.
49
46. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil, Inc., 457 U.S. 922 (1982). In assessing attribution to
the State, a court must find that the deprivation must first be caused by "the exercise of
some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state."
Id. at 937. Second, the person who caused the deprivation must be deemed a state actor. Id.
A person is deemed to be a state actor when, inter alia, his conduct is "otherwise
chargeable to the State." Id. These two criteria collapse into each other in cases in which the
claim is made against individuals who have acted under apparent authority of state law as to
lend the weight of the state to their decisions. Id. Civil commitment is such a case. See infra
notes 229 through 243 and accompanying text.
47. See generally, e.g., supra note 17.
48. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). In each of these
cases, the Court determined that the actions of private political parties constituted state
action.
49. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). In Marsh, the Court held that the
owners of a company town could not prohibit a Jehovah's Witness from distributing religious
literature since whether a corporation or municipality owns or possesses the town, the
public has an identical interest in the channels of communication remaining open. Id. at 507.
In so holding, the Court recognized that in order to act as good citizens, the residents of
Chickasaw, Alabama must be informed, which required the provision of uncensored
information: "There is no more reason for depriving these people of the liberties guaranteed
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is for curtailing these freedoms with
respect to any other citizen." Id. at 508-09.
After Marsh, the Court again addressed this type of state action issue in Amalgamated
Food Employees' Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), and Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). In
Amalgamated Food the Court held that a shopping center resembled a business area of a
municipality, which resulted in a holding that the First Amendment protected picketing of
union employees. Amalgamated Food, 391 U.S. at 315, 319. However, in Lloyd Corp., the
Court held that the First Amendment did not protect individuals who sought to distribute
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Although in 1952 the Court concluded that actions of a private
utility constituted state action,5° in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Company,5 the Court reached the opposite conclusion that the
private utility company was not a state actor. Jackson can be
considered the beginning of modem state action jurisprudence.
While prior to Jackson, the Burger Court chipped away and limited
the liberal state action views of the Warren Court,52 in Jackson, the
Court began to formulate what can be considered modem day state
action jurisprudence by analyzing and narrowly interpreting its
prior state action decisions. In so doing, the Court began to
develop a seriatim approach to determining whether private
entities have engaged in state action.
This approach has resulted in the Court "articulat[ing] a number
of factors, or tests in different contexts" to determine whether
private individuals engaged in state action.-' These tests include the
"public function" test, the "state compulsion" test, the "nexus" test,
and the "joint action" test.M The public function test examines
"whether the function performed has been 'traditionally the
exclusive prerogative of the State.'-55 The nexus test examines
"whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the challenged
action" of the private party so that the action of the private party
"may be fairly treated as that of the State itself."M The state
compulsion test examines whether a state "has exercised coercive
power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt
or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed that of the
State."57 The joint action test focuses on whether the private party
"jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action."58
pamphlets that were unrelated to the actions of the shopping center. Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at
569-70. In Hudgens, the Supreme Court interpreted Lloyd Corp. as overruling Logan Valley
as the Court noted that the "rationale of Logan Valley did not survive the Court's opinion in
the Lloyd case." Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 518.
50. See Public Utils. Comm'n. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
51. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
52. See, e.g., Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). For a detailed comparison of
the manner in which the Warren and Burger courts addressed the state action doctrine, see
Schneider, supra note 17 at 758-84.
53. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939.
54. Id.
55. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S.. 830, 842 (1982) (emphasis in original) (internal
quotes omitted).
56. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
57. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
58. Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970). Recently, the Court determined
that a private not-for-profit organization that regulated interscholastic sports was a state
actor because of the substantial entwinement of public officials and public schools within its
2001
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In addition to these tests, the Supreme Court has also recognized
that state action can exist under what it has characterized as the
"abuse of authority doctrine." 9 Likewise, the Court has addressed
the state action issue without any reference to any of these tests.
Instead, the Court has developed a functional approach to state
action jurisprudence by examining the role played by the private
defendant viz-a-viz the state.60
In Jackson, the Court attempted to analyze prior state action
case law and concluded that the Supreme Court has "found state
action present in the exercise by a private entity of powers
traditionally exclusively reserved to the state."61 The Court
concluded that the provision of utility service is not "traditionally
associated with sovereignty" since Pennsylvania law does not
impose an obligation on the state to provide utility service.
62
Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks,6 was the first, and probably most
significant, of a number of cases in which the Court examined
whether the actions taken by private creditors constituted state
action.64 In Flagg Brothers, a number of debtors sought damages
and an injunction against a creditor who threatened to sell off the
belongings of the debtors that the creditors had stored.6 They
argued that the State of New York had delegated to the creditor,
Flagg Brothers, "a power 'traditionally exclusively reserved to the
State,' "6 namely, the resolution of private disputes.
The Supreme Court rejected this contention. The Court evaluated
its prior public function case law and noted, "the conduct of the
elections themselves is an exclusively public function."67 The Court
then noted that Marsh v. Alabama68 and Amalgamated Food
organization. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n., 121 S. Ct. 924 (2001).
It remains to be seen whether this examination of entwinement becomes an additional state
action test. See id., at 940 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
59. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 940. For a discussion of how this standard relates to civil
commitment, see infra notes 232-90 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 291-314 and accompanying text.
61. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352. In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited, inter alia,
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (involving elections); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 510
(1946) (dealing with a company town); and Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (involving
a municipal park).
62. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353.
63. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
64. The Court also examined the actions of private creditors in Lugar and Tulsa
Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
65. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 153.
66. Id. at 157.
67. Id. at 158.
68. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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presented a second type of state action cases. Both these types of
cases had "in common the feature of exclusivity."69 However,
whereas the elections held by the Democratic Party and its
affiliates were the only meaningful elections in Texas and the
streets owned by Gulf Shipbuilding Company were the only streets
in Chickasaw, the sale of property was not the sole means of
resolving the private dispute at hand.70
More significantly, the Court reaffirmed that any state action
analysis requires recognition of the "'essential dichotomy'.
between public and private acts."7' The activity at hand was private.
New York law created a "system of rights and remedies [that]
recogniz[ed] the traditional place of private arrangements in
ordering relationships in the commercial world, [which] can hardly
be said to have delegated to Flagg Brothers an exclusive
prerogative of the sovereign."
72
The Supreme Court has also determined when professionals
whose activities have some connection to the state will be deemed
state actors. In Polk County v. Dodson,73 the Court concluded that
public defenders do not engage in state action when they represent
defendants in criminal prosecutions. 4 The Court first recognized
that an individual "acts under color of state law only when
exercising power 'possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority
of state law.'"5 However, the actions of the public defender
69. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 159.
70. Id. at 159-60.
71. Id. at 165 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974)).
72. Id. at 160. The Court's characterization of the utilization of remedies by creditors as
not being a delegation of "an exclusive prerogative of the sovereign," as opposed to being an
exclusive function of the government, is significant. See infra notes 315-32 and
accompanying text.
Unlike Flagg Brothers, the Supreme Court in Lugar and Tulsa Professional Collection
Services found state action. The Court distinguished private use of state-sanctioned
remedies, which did not constitute state action from situations in which private parties
invoke state procedures with significant assistance from state officials. See Tulsa Prof l
Collection Servs., 485 U.S. at 485. In Tulsa Collection, the Supreme Court held that the
involvement of the state's probate court in connection with the appointment of an executor
required that notice be provided to an estate's creditor in order to satisfy due process. Id. at
488. In Lugar, the Court concluded that because private creditors could dispose of property
only with the involvement of state officials, the Constitution governed the actions of the
creditor. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941.
73. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
74. In Polk County, the Court recognized that under a different set of circumstances,
such as when making employment decisions on behalf of the state, actions of a public
defender might be deemed state action. Polk County, 454 U.S. at 325.
75. Polk County, 454 U.S. at 317-18 (quoting U.S. v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). A
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"entailed functions and obligations in no way dependent on state
authority."6 Except for the source of payment, the public defender
is in the same position as any other attorney who represents a
criminal defendant.77 The Court rejected the idea that state action
existed because of the employment relationship that existed
between the professional and the state. Notwithstanding the
payment of a public defender by the government, a public defender
owes a duty of "undivided loyalty" to his client that places him in
an adversarial position with the state.78
In Blum v. Yaretsky, 9 the Court concluded that decisions by
private nursing homes to discharge Medicaid patients did not
constitute state action.80 Like the situation in Polk County, any
decision to discharge Medicaid patients "turn[ed] on medical
judgments made by private parties according to professional
standards that have not been established by the State."8' Likewise,
as was the case in Polk County, the professionals in Blum made
decisions pursuant to their professional canons of ethics and were
not dictated by a rule of conduct imposed by the State.
8 2
Accordingly, a decision to transfer a Medicaid recipient was "purely
a medical judgment."83 Consequently, such transfer decisions were
not "the kind of decisions traditionally and exclusively made by the
sovereign for and on behalf of the public."84
However, in West v. Atkins,85 the Supreme Court ruled that a
physician, under contract with a State to provide medical services
to a prisoner, engaged in state action when he provided such
medical services.8 6 While the provision of medical services is
traditionally a private function, "the context" in which the prison
doctor performed medical services for the State, namely the
provision of medical services in a prison, distinguished the
situation at hand from the "ordinary physician-patient
person engages in state action when he acts under color of state law. See, e.g., Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 182 n.4 (1988); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,
457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982); Lugar, 457 U.S. at 935-37 n.18.
76. Polk County, 454 U.S. at 318.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 319-20.
79. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
80. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1012.
81. Id. at 1008.
82. Id. at 1009.
83. Id. at 1006 n.16.
84. Id. at 1012.
85. 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
86. West, 487 U.S. at 54.
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relationship."87
In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,81 the Supreme Court concluded that a
decision to discharge teachers at a private school for maladjusted
students did not constitute state action.89 The Court first equated
the school with other private corporations that conducted business
with the government.90 The Court then analogized the school to the
public defender in Polk County. Just as the relationship between
the public defender and her client was no different than any other
attorney-client relationship, the payment of student tuition by the
state did not change the relationship between the school and its
teachers.91
The Court further concluded that the school did not perform the
type of "public function" that would render it a state actor. The
Court emphasized that the public function test is satisfied when the
function performed "has been 'traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the State.'"92 However, until recently, the State had
not provided education for students whom the traditional public
schools could not serve.93
In Rendell-Baker, the Court also equated the school with other
private corporations that conducted business with the government.
The actions of such private parties did not become acts of the
government because of public contracts. Similarly, just as the
public defender in Polk County did not engage in state action
because the attorney-client relationship involving the public
defender was no different than any other lawyer-client relationship,
the relationship between the teachers and the school did not
change simply because the state paid the tuition of the students.94
Justice White concurred in the judgment in Rendell-Baker. He
emphasized that the teachers challenged an employment decision
of the state. Because employment decisions of the school were not
subject to extensive state regulation, the school did not base its
employment decision to discharge the teachers "upon some rule of
87. Id. at 56-57 n.15.
88. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
89. RendeU-Baker, 457 U.S. at 832, 837.
90. Id. at 840-41.
91. Id. at 841.
92. Id. at 842 (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353) (emphasis in original).
93. Id. Put another way, private parties were at liberty to establish schools that
educated students whom traditional public schools could not serve. For a discussion as to
the interrelationship between common law liberty and the state action doctrine, see infra
notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
94. RendeU-Baker 457 U.S. at 832, 837.
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conduct or policy put forth by the State."95 Accordingly, the
decision to discharge the teachers remained a private decision not
attributable to the state.
96
The Supreme Court has also examined how the interrelationship
between state officials and a private enterprise impacted upon a
determination of state action. In National Collegiate Athletic
Association v. Tarkanian,97 a state university sought to discipline
its basketball coach pursuant to the disciplinary procedures of the
National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA"), an
unincorporated athletic association consisting of public and private
universities.9 8 The Supreme Court concluded that the actions of the
NCAA did not constitute state action.99
In analyzing the issue at hand, the Court noted that the case
"uniquely mirror[ed] the traditional state action case."1°° In such a
traditional state action case, a private party has taken the decisive
step that caused harm to a plaintiff and a court must ask whether
the State provided the authority that enhanced the power of the
private party.
10 1
In Tarkanian, a state university, acting in accordance with NCAA
rules, intended to punish its basketball coach.102 However, the
university's planned actions did not turn the NCAA into a state
actor. The source of the NCAA's policies was not any state law but
its collective membership, which was independent of any particular
state.0 3 Moreover, the state university had vigorously opposed
sanctions that the NCAA had sought to impose. °4 Hence, the
actions of the NCAA were deemed private and actions taken
pursuant to NCAA rules were not taken under color of state law.105
In the Supreme Court's most recent term, the Court concluded in
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Association,0 6 that a private not-for-profit organization that
regulated interscholastic sports within the state engaged in state
95. Id. at 844 (White, J., concurring).
96. Id. (White, J., concurring).
97. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
98. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 186-87.
99. Id. at 199.
100. Id. at 192.
101. Id.
102. The plaintiff had yet to suffer harm as he sought declaratory and injunctive relief
before the university could impose sanctions. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 187.
103. Id. at 193.
104. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 199.
105. Id.
106. 121 S. Ct 924 (2001).
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action when it sanctioned a private school for recruiting
violations. 17  Because 84% of the corporation's membership
consisted of public schools, there was substantial entwinement of
public officials and public schools within the private organization
and the corporation could be said to exercise the authority of the
public schools to meet the corporation's responsibilities. 08
Three years after Tarkanian, in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Company,1°9 the Supreme Court relied upon a number of indices of
government involvement with private litigants to conclude that the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in jury selection
violated the Equal Protection Clause."0 In so holding, the Court did
not strictly apply any of its state action "tests." Instead, the Court
relied on various portions of the public function test, the joint
action test and the abuse of authority doctrine."' The Court found
that the use of peremptory challenges could exist only with the
participation of the government because the government
administers the jury system,' 2 and the use of a jury "involves the
performance of a traditional function of the government.""13 Finally,.
the Court noted that the use of discriminatory peremptory
challenges "is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of
governmental authority"1 4 because the government permits this
discrimination in its courthouse."
15
Prior to Brentwood Academy, the Supreme Court last re-visited
the state action issue in American Manufacturers Mutual
Insurance Company v. Sullivan.116 In American Manufacturers,
the Court addressed the issue of whether or not private insurers,
which provided coverage under a state's workers' compensation
laws, engaged in state action when the insurer suspended payment
pending a review of the reasonableness or necessity of the
treatment provided.1"7
107. Brentwood Acad., 121 S.Ct. at 932-34.
108. Id. at 932-33.
109. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
110. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 625-30.
111. Id. at 620-22.
112. Id. at 622.
113. Id. at 624.
114. Id. at 622.
115. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 628.
116. 119 S. Ct. 977 (1999).
117. Am. Mfrs., 119 S.Ct. at 982-83. Under the state law, an insurer could request a
utilization review by forwarding a one-page document to the Workers' Compensation Bureau
of the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry. Id. The Compensation Bureau then
forwards the request to a utilization review organization ("URO"), a private health care
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The Court framed the case as a "dispute between an insurer and
an employee". The Court also characterized the state law that
authorized the withholding of payment pending review as the
restoration to insurers of an option, historically available to
employers and insurers, to withhold payment of a medical bill until
it had been substantiated.118 Use of the URO process constituted "a
remedy for wrongful conduct" and the "[p]rivate use of
state-sanctioned private remedies or procedures does not rise to
the level of state action."119
In American Manufacturers, the Court rejected two other
arguments by the plaintiffs. First, it distinguished West, because in
West, the state was constitutionally obligated to provide medical
treatment to prisoners and the delegation of this traditionally
exclusive public function gave rise to a finding of state action.1 20
Second, the decision-making authority to determine whether or not
to suspend payment for disputed medical treatment was not a
traditionally exclusive governmental function. 121
III. RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE TO DATE BY FEDERAL COURTS
Prior to the Supreme Court concluding that the government
could not effectuate civil commitment absent substantive and
procedural safeguards, 22 a number of federal courts concluded that
civil commitment did not constitute state action. However, the
rationale behind these holdings is so erroneous and outdated that
these cases .should, and generally do, serve as historical (and law
review) footnotes. 23
provider that had the same or similar specialty as the provider of treatment under review. Id.
at 983. If the URO found in favor of the employer, the employee could appeal to a workers'
compensation judge for a de novo review. Id.
118. Id. at 987.
119. Id. at 986 (quoting Tulsa Profl, 485 U.S. at 485).
120. Id. at 988.
121. Id. at 987-88.
122. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975); Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
123. In Spampinato v. Breger & Co., 270 E2d 46 (2d Cir. 1959), a pro se plaintiff
asserted that a number of individuals induced a psychiatrist associated with a hospital
operated by New York City to certify him for hospitalization at the hospital where he
remained for seventeen days until a judge ordered his release. In affirming the dismissal of
the plaintiffs complaint, the court first held that the physician who certified the plaintiff for
hospitalization acted in his capacity as a private citizen. Id. at 49. The court then noted that
the plaintiff failed to assert that the actions of the defendants deprived him of due process
of law, and in the absence of such allegations, the complaint, at most, stated a claim under
state law. Id.
The Court in Spampinato failed to make clear the relationship of the psychiatrist who
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A. The District Courts Find State Action in Civil Commitment
Cases
From the late 1970s through the middle 1990s a number of
district courts were required to examine the state action issue.
Most, but not all of those courts held that private physicians who
civilly committed individuals to private hospitals engaged in state
action. 124 The holdings were based on a number of separate but
related factors.
First, physicians who involuntarily hospitalize mentally ill
individuals are clothed with state authority.125 More specifically, the
certified the plaintiff to the state. The court simply noted that the psychiatrist was
"associated" with the City hospital. If the City employed the physician, no one would
seriously assert that the doctor was not liable under § 1983 and hence, a state actor. See,
e.g., Rodriguez v. City of New York, 72 F3d 1051, 1062-63 (2d Cir. 1995); Demarco v. Sadiker,
897 F. Supp. 693, 698-700 (E.D.N.Y 1995).
In Joyce v. Ferrazzi, 323 F2d 931 (lst Cir. 1963), an allegedly mentally ill individual sued,
inter alia, a private physician who committed him under Massachusetts' civil commitment
laws. In granting summary judgment to the defendants, the court, relying upon Spampinato,
noted in a conclusory fashion that the doctor's action was that of a private citizen. Id. at 933.
In Duzynski v. Nosal, 324 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1963), an individual who was committed to
the Chicago State Hospital sued, inter alia, a physician who certified her for involuntary
hospitalization under Illinois' civil commitment laws, and a court clerk who presented the
certification to a judge. The plaintiff also sued two physicians who examined the plaintiff
pursuant to a court order and recommended her hospitalization. After granting judicial
immunity to the physicians who examined the plaintiff pursuant to a court order, the court
held that the court clerk did not act in his official position but that of a private citizen. Id. at
930. The court then held that although the Cook County Mental Health Clinic employed the
committing physician, the physician did not act in his capacity as a county official but a
private physician and did not engage in state action. Id.
In Byrne v. Kysar, 347 F.2d. 734 (7th Cir. 1965), a civilly committed individual sued a
number of people involved in his hospitalization, including the physician who certified him
for hospitalization and the physicians whom a court appointed to examine him. The court
relied on Duzynski to summarily hold that the certifying physician acted in his private
capacity even though the City of Chicago employed him. Id. at 736. The other physicians
were entitled to judicial immunity since they were members of the court. Id.
Only Dyzynski and Byrne have retained any significance. Their significance rests on the
reliance by the Seventh Circuit in Spencer v. Lee, 864 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc)
when it attempted to justify its decision that civil commitment constitutes state action. See
infra note 395 and accompanying text.
124. See Plain v. Flicker, 645 F. Supp. 898, 908 (D.N.J. 1986); Brown v. Jensen, 572 F
Supp. 193, 197 n.1 (D. Colo. 1983); Watkins v. Roche, 560 F Supp. 416, 419 (S.D. Ga. 1983);
Kay v. Benson, 472 F. Supp. 850, 851 (D.N.H. 1979); Ruffler v. Phelps Mem. Hosp., 453 F.
Supp. 1062, 1068-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In Willacy v. Lewis, 598 F. Supp. 346, 349 (D.D.C. 1984),
and Davenport v. Saint Mary Hospital, 633 F. Supp. 1228, 1237 (E.D. Pa. 1986), the court
strongly suggested that private physicians who certify mentally ill individuals for
hospitalization engage in state action but held that the parties had to develop a greater
factual record before the court could reach a final decision on this question. Willacy, 598 F
Supp. at 349-50; Davenport, 633 F Supp. at 1237.
125. Davenport, 633 F Supp. at 1237; Willacy, 598 F Supp. at 349; Watkins, 560 F.
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use of state authority results in the deprivation of liberty.126
Likewise, the commitment of mentally ill individuals is an exercise
of the state's parens patriae or police powers."27 The courts also
found state action because the state's civil commitment laws were
part of an overall comprehensive regulatory scheme. 128 Finally,
some courts have recognized that a finding that civil commitment
does not constitute state action would permit a state to avoid its
constitutional obligations that arise when that state confines a
mentally ill individual.
29
Even after a number of circuit courts held that physicians who
civilly commit an individual to a private hospital do not engage in
state action, 30 a number of district courts held that such doctors
were state actors. In Rubenstein v. Benedictine Hospital,31 the
court concluded that the power of detention is normally and
historically exercised by the government through it parens patriae
or police powers.132 In Moore v. Wyoming Medical Center,'3 a
Supp. at 419; Kay, 472 F Supp. at 851.
126. Plain, 645 F Supp. at 907; Brown, 572 F Supp. at 197 n.1. Similarly, the Supreme
Court of Nevada in Cummings v. Charter Hospital of Las Vegas, 896 P.2d 1137 (Nev. 1995)
and a New York interniediate appeals court in Snyder v. Albany Medical Center Hospital,
615 N.Y.S.2d 139 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) both held that civil commitment is state action
because of the state authority provided to private hospitals that enabled such hospitals to
confine an allegedly mentally ill person. Cummings, 896 P.2d at 1144-45; Snyder, 615 N.YS.
2d at 140.
127. Plain, 645 F Supp. at 907; Willacy, 598 F Supp. at 349; Ruffler, 453 F Supp. at
1070.
128. Ruffler, 453 F Supp. at 1069. In so holding, the court concluded that:
the statutory scheme expressly contemplates that in performing this public function of
caring for [the mentally disabled] the State may utilize private entities of the sort we
have here. This is precisely what the [county] officials did when they transferred
[plaintiff] to the care of [New York Hospital]. But, as the statute makes
incontrovertibly clear, it is the State, which in effect is providing the care through the
private institutions. This exercise of the administrative placing prerogative does not
affect in any way the State's ultimate responsibility for the well-being of the [plaintiff]
and, consequently, the public nature of the function being performed.
Id. (quoting Perez v. Sugarman, 499 F 2d 761, 765 (2d Cir. 1974) (emphasis in Perez)
(bracketed material in Ruffler)).
129. Davenport, 633 F Supp. at 1234; Plain, 645 F. Supp. at 908. On the other hand, the
courts in Landry v. Odom, 559 F Supp. 514, 518 (E.D. La. 1983) and Watkins v. Roche, 529 F
Supp. 327, 330 (S.D. Ga. 1981), held that a finding that civil commitment is state action
would chill physicians in the exercise of their medical judgment in emergency situations.
130. See infra notes 139-81 and accompanying text.
131. 790 F Supp. 396 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
132. Rubenstein, 790 F Supp. at 406. The court further recognized that because New
York's civil commitment scheme was part of the state's comprehensive scheme to provide
services to mentally ill individuals and the commitment of individuals is a public function,
involuntary hospitalization satisfied both the "public function" and "close nexus" tests. Id. at
405.
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number of factors warranted a finding of state action. First, the
county and the private hospital that involuntarily hospitalized the
plaintiff were financially interdependent. Second, under the terms
of its lease with the county, the private hospital had a duty to
provide services to indigent patients. Another factor was the county
retained responsibility for the hospitalY"' Finally, the court further
concluded that state action would also exist because the private
hospital acted in concert with police officers to detain the
plaintiff.'35
B. The Circuit Courts Go the Other Way and Find No State
Action in Civil Commitment
In Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental Health Services,
Inc.,136 the Eleventh Circuit became the fir-st appeals court to
address the state action issue in the modem state action era. The
court held that the confinement of a mentally ill individual to a
facility designated by the state to receive mentally ill individuals
constituted state action.'3 7 The court reasoned that the private
mental health facility could confine the mentally ill person only
because the facility was clothed with the authority of state law and
the facility had authority to confine the individual for periods of
time that no private citizen possessed'- 8
Notwithstanding Burch, in Spencer, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that physicians who civilly commit an individual to a
private hospital do not engage in state action. In concluding that
civil commitment does not constitute state action, the Seventh
133. 825 F Supp. 1531 (D. Wyo. 1993).
134. Moore, 825 F. Supp. at 1541.
135. Id. at 1542. Unlike the courts in Moore and Rubenstein, the court in Lewis v.
Law-Yone, 813 F Supp. 1247 (N.D. Tex. 1993) held that civil commitment is not state action.
The government did not insinuate itself with the private defendants as to make them state
actors. Lewis, 813 F Supp. at 1254. Nor was civil commitment a power exclusively reserved
to the state. Id. at 1255. Finally, the state neither coerced nor significantly encouraged
private physicians to civilly commit the plaintiff. Id. Like the court in Law-Yone, the court in
Landry, held in a conclusory fashion that the actions of a private physician did not satisfy
either the public function or state compulsion tests. Landry, 559 F Supp. at 518. The court
in Watkins also concluded that civil commitment does not constitute state action. The court
reasoned that because ordinary citizens can initiate the civil commitment process, physicians
who civilly commit a mentally ill person do not perform a public function. Watkins, 529 F
Supp. at 330. Moreover, the state's civil commitment statute did not require physicians to
execute a civil commitment certificate. Id. at 330-31.
136. 840 F2d 797 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
137. Burch, 840 F2d at 803.
138. Id. at 803 n.12.
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Circuit first noted that state law was not passed to encourage
commitments. 139 The court then rejected the argument that civil
comnitment is state action because of the detainment of the
individual. In ancient Greece and Rome, and England until the
nineteenth century, private individuals made most arrests and
prosecutions. Hence, arrest has never been an exclusive
government function.140 Then, without citing any authority, the
court concluded that "[niot all state-authorized coercion is
government action."41 Accordingly, civil commitment was no
different than the eviction of trespassers, the repossession of
chattels, or a citizen's arrest.
42
In Spencer, the court next examined the history of psychiatric
hospitalization to determine whether it was an exclusive
governmental function and found that, historically, Illinois law
permitted confinement by a private person for ten days.'" The
court then cited history books that found that friends or relatives
could commit a mentally ill person. As a result, the Court found
that civil commitment was not an exclusive function of the
government.'"
Four judges on the en banc panel in Spencer concluded that civil
commitment is state action. Judges Ripple and Flaum recognized
that misuse of state power that is made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with authority under state law constitutes
action "under color of law."45 Judges Cummings and Cudahy
recognized that the state could not escape responsibility for a
violation of constitutional rights when it delegates a sovereign
function.
146
Three years later, in Harvey v. Harvey,4 7 the Eleventh Circuit
repudiated its decision in Burch and became the next circuit to
hold that civil commitment is not state action. First, the court
opined that civil commitment is not state action because, inter
alia, the Georgia statutes neither compelled nor encouraged civil
commitment.' 48 Next, the court concluded that civil commitment is
139. Spencer, 864 F2d at 1379.
140. Id. at 1380.
141. Id.
142. Id. 1380-81.
143. Id. at 1380.
144. Spencer, 864 F.2d at 1381.
145. Id. at 1385.
146. Id. at 1388 (citing West, 487 U.S. at 55-56).
147. 949 F.2d 1127 (11th Cir. 1992).
148. Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1130.
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not "so reserved to the state that action under the commitment
statute transforms a private actor into a state actor."149 The court
further noted that state law acts as a licensing provision, which is
insufficient to transform private hospitals into state actors.
1'0
Finally, the court concluded that commitment decisions are
medical judgments made according to professional standards that
are not established by the state. 151
In Janicsko v. Pellman, 52 the Third Circuit joined the other
circuits in holding that civil commitment does not constitute state
action. The court affirmed a district court opinion that concluded
that state law permitted doctor's to exercise their professional
discretion, and under Blum, their decisions could not be
considered that of the state.
153
In Rockwell v. Cape Cod Hospital,14 the First Circuit concluded
that the involuntary hospitalization of a mentally ill person did not
satisfy the state compulsion, nexus/joint action or public function
tests. The state compulsion test was not satisfied because state law
did not compel or encourage commitment.155 The nexus/joint action
test was not satisfied because extensive government regulation and
the receipt of federal funds did not convert private action to action
taken under color of state law.
56
In concluding that involuntary hospitalization did not satisfy civil
commitment the court distinguished between involuntary "ad-
mission" and "commitment". Historically, only commitment required
action by a judge.15 On the other hand, since the Colonial era,
private individuals provided care for mentally ill individuals and
since the turn of the century, both private individuals and
physicians could arrange for the admission of mentally ill
individuals.'5
In Ellison v. Garbarino,1 9 the Sixth Circuit concluded that the
149. Id. at 1131.
150. Id. at 1132.
151. Id.
152. 970 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1992) affg without opinion, 774 F. Supp. 331 (M.D. Pa.
1991).
153. Janicsko, 774 F Supp. at 339. In Janicsko, private doctors were required to
determine whether a mentally ill person's capacity to exercise self-control, judgment, and
discretion in the conduct of his affairs is impaired. Id. at 337.
154. 26 F.3d 254 (lst Cir. 1994).
155. Rockwell, 26 F3d at 258.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 259.
158. Id. at 260.
159. 48 F3d 192 (6th Cir. 1995).
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Tennessee commitment statutes did not compel or encourage
private involuntary commitments. 16° Nor did civil commitment
satisfy the public function test. The court reasoned that analysis of
this question is state specific, and the plaintiff bore the burden of
establishing that commitment in Tennessee is a public function.
Because the plaintiff did not offer any legal analysis on this issue,
the court rejected the public function test as a basis for finding
state action.161 Finally, the court rejected West as authority because,
unlike the physician in West, the defendants in the present case
were not under contract with the state.'62
In Pino v. Higgs,16 the Tenth Circuit concluded that physicians
who certified a patient for involuntary hospitalization did not
engage in state action because any decision to commit was a
medical judgment and not a decision that the doctors made
pursuant to professional standards established by the state. 16 The
court added that for reasons similar to those given by the courts in
Harvey and Spencer, the certification by a private physician did not
constitute state action.
65
In S.P v. City of Takoma Park,61 an involuntarily hospitalized
individual asserted that private physicians were state actors
because state law encouraged civil commitments. 67 The court
rejected this argument noting that another provision of the
commitment law provided that a petition for involuntary
hospitalization may be made if a petitioner believes that the patient
poses a danger to himself or others.' 6s Like the courts in Harvey
and Pino, the court in S.P concluded that any decision to commit
constituted a medical judgment that was not made pursuant to
professional standards established by the state. 169
Subsequently, in Okunieff v. Rosenberg,170 the Second Circuit
affirmed the district court decision that held that civil commitment
160. E//ison, 48 E3d at 196.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 197.
163. 75 F3d 1461 (10th Cir. 1996).
164. Pino, 75 F.3d at 1466.
165. Id. at 1466-67.
166. 134 F3d 260 (4th Cir. 1998).
167. S.P., 134 E3d at 268-69. The plaintiff asserted that under state law, if a patient met
the standards for involuntary admission, the examining physician shall take steps for his
involuntary admission. Id.
168. Id. at 270. The court also relied on Spencer, Pino, Harvey, and Janicsko to
conclude that the defendants were not state actors. Id. at 269-70.
169. Id. at 270.
170. 166 E3d 507 (2d Cir. 1999).
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is not state action for "substantially" the same reasons given by the
district court.171 The district court had first concluded that civil
commitment did not satisfy the state compulsion test because the
state does not compel civil commitments. 172 In reaching this
decision, the court concluded that notwithstanding the existence of
legal standards under the Mental Hygiene Law, when determining
whether or not to commit, physicians employed medical judgments
based upon standards in the medical community.
173
Next, the court in Okunieff held that civil commitment did not
satisfy the close nexus/joint action test because a person's
hospitalization did not involve a situation in which the state is a
joint participant in the "enterprise."174 The court further held that
civil commitment did not satisfy the public function test because
the committing physicians did not exercise powers "that were
'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.' "15
Consequently, the court, relying on Spencer, equated civil
commitment to a citizen's arrest, the repossession of chattels, and
the ejection of trespassers.
76
Finally, the court rejected the position of Rubenstein
Benedictine Hospital that civil commitment constitutes state action
because the state provides authority to deprive a person of
liberty.177 Rather, the district court concluded that the authority
which private physicians and private hospitals use to commit an
individual is derived from the professional medical standard of the
community where the physicians' medical judgments are based.
78
The Fifth Circuit, in Bass v. Parkwood Hospital,'79 became the
next circuit to hold that physicians who civilly commit a mentally
ill person do not engage in state action. First, the court reasoned
that the State of Mississippi's commitment statutes neither
compelled nor encouraged the private initiation of commitment
proceedings.'80 The court then concluded that civil commitment has
not been a function exclusively reserved to the state.'8 '
171. Id.
172. Okunieff v. Rosenberg, 996 F Supp. 343, 349 (S.D.N.Y 1998).
173. Id. at 351.
174. Id. at 352.
175. Id. at 353 (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353).
176. Id. at 356.
177. Okunieff, 996 F Supp. at 354.
178. Id.
179. 180 F3d 234 (5th Cir. 1999).
180. Bass, 180 F.3d at 243.
181. Id. In so holding, the court recognized that the Mississippi Constitution imposes a
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In Jensen v. Lane County,182 the Ninth Circuit became the first
circuit court to conclude that private physicians who civilly
committed a mentally ill individual engaged in state action. The
court found that the plaintiff satisfied the state action test because
the state "so deeply insinuated itself" into the civil commitment
process as to result in a sufficiently close nexus between the state
and the actions of the private defendant.1' County employees
initiated the evaluation process, significant consultation took place
between county and private mental health professionals, and the
private medical group helped to develop and maintain mental
health policies at the county hospital at which the plaintiff was
initially detained.' 14 The Ninth Circuit did not cite or refer to any of
the adverse authority from other circuit courts and simply noted
that this case fell "between lines drawn in other jurisdictions."'8 5
IV. UNDERLYING CONSIDERATIONS WHEN REEVALUATING THE
APPLICABILITY OF THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE TO THE CIVIL
COMMITMENT PROCESS
A. Framing the State Action Question
The outcome of any legal dispute may well depend on how one
frames the legal issue at hand.8 6 Hence, it is no surprise that in
state action litigation, the parties and/or the courts have, at times,
framed the challenged activity differently.'
87
The decisions by the Third Circuit and the Supreme Court in
American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company illustrate
how characterization of the activity of the private defendants can
virtually dictate a particular result. The Third Circuit characterized
duty on the state to care for the mentally in. However, in Bacon v. Bacon, 24 So. 968 (Miss.
1899), the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld a lawsuit against two physicians who filed two
commitment certificates even though the physicians were not the individuals legally charged
with making commitment decisions. This decision, the Circuit Court held, reflected that
"private citizens in Mississippi had been participating in the commitment process for over
one hundred years." Id.
182. 222 F3d 570 (9th Cir. 2000).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 573, 575.
185. Id. at 574-75.
186. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (recognizing that
any determination of whether or not the Constitution protects a particular activity may well
turn on whether a court characterizes the activity in question as the exercise of a
fundamental right; whether an activity is deemed to be an exercise of a fundamental right
depends upon how a court characterizes the actions in question).
187. See, e.g., Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 157, 162-63.
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the actions of the defendants as "providing public benefits which
honor state entitlements."1' On the other hand, the Supreme Court
characterized the actions of the defendants as "a private insurer's
decision to withhold payment for disputed medical treatment."
18 9
It appears that the Supreme Court has not given much thought as
to how to frame the actions of private parties. While the court in
Flagg Brothers framed the actions of the private defendants as
creditors who engaged in private commercial transactions and
undertook self-help remedies, 190 Justice Marshall in his dissent
characterized the conduct of the creditor as "the execution of a
lien... [an action that] ... traditionally has been the function of
the Sheriff." 91 Likewise, in RendeU-Baker the majority equated a
private school with many private corporations whose business
depended on governmental contracts. 92 On the other hand, the
Court's dissenters characterized the activity of the private school as
the statutorily imposed duty to educate children that had been
delegated by the government. 93 In neither of these cases, nor in
any other state action case, did any justice address the appropriate
methodology characterizing the challenged .activity.
It is easy to see how the characterization of the actions that
result in the involuntary hospitalization of a mentally ill individual
can have a significant impact on the resolution of this issue. On
one hand, civil commitment involves the provision of psychiatric
treatment to those in need of such assistance.94 Hence, one can
characterize civil commitment as the provision of medical care. 195
On the other hand, civil commitment constitutes a significant
deprivation of liberty.196 Hence, one can also frame the question at
hand as whether the deprivation of physical liberty constitutes state
188. Am. Mfrs., 119 S.Ct. at 987 (quoting 139 F2d 158, 168 (3d Cir. 1998)).
189. Id. at 986 (emphasis in original); see also West, 487 U.S. at 46 n.6 (noting that the
court of appeals equated the medical care given to a prisoner with the medical care provided
to Medicaid recipients in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), which appeals court
characterized as the "day-to-day rendering of medical services by a physician").
190. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 161-63, 162 n.12.
191. Id. at 167-68 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co.,
300 N.E.2d 710, 713-14 (N.Y. 1973)).
192. Rendel-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840-41.
193. Id. at 844 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
194. See Goetz v. Crosson, 967 F2d 29, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1992).
195. See Okunieff, 996 F Supp. at 356 (equating actions of physicians who involuntarily
confine a patient with actions of a private general hospital). Certainly, framing the issue in
this matter virtually preordains a holding that civil commitment is not state action as "the
provision of medical services is a function traditionally performed by private individuals."
West, 487 U.S. at 56 n.15.
196. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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action.
However, all deprivations of liberty are not the same. A citizen's
arrest in which a person is detained and promptly turned over to
the police differs greatly from a situation in which police officers
collaborate with private individuals to arrest and prosecute
someone for a crime that results in a prison sentence. 197 Because
civil commitment often results in a deprivation for a number of
weeks prior to any court hearing,19 8 one can more accurately
characterize the issue as whether the deprivation of physical liberty
for an extended period of time constitutes state action.1"
A private physician who involuntarily hospitalizes a mentally ill
individual does so for the purposes of providing treatment to a
mentally ill person and protecting either the public from the
dangerous tendencies of the mentally ill person or the person from
the risk of harm that he may pose to himself.2°° Accordingly, civil
commitment is simply not a situation in which an individual
receives medical services. Rather, the decision to commit is an
exercise of the state's parens patriae and police powers.
201
197. See, e.g., Griffin v. Maryland, 376 U.S. 130 (1964).
198. See, e.g., Goetz v. Crosson, 41 F3d 800, 804 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing that the
appointment of an independent expert can delay civil commitment hearings a month or
longer); French v. Blackburn, 428 F Supp. 1351, 1355 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (holding that
confinement for 10 days with opportunity for additional continuances does not violate the
Constitution); Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265, 1268-70 (D. Conn. 1972) (authorizing 45
day confinement without hearing).
199. These two characterizations of the civil commitment process can result in
different outcomes: The deprivation of any physical liberty is not a power that has been
traditionally exclusively reserved to the states as private citizens have had the right to make
citizens' arrests. See Spencer, 864 F.2d at 1380; Okunieff, 996 F. Supp. at 353 (noting arrest,
search and detention are not exclusively reserved to the state). While common law and now
statutory law have permitted the short-term detainment of a shoplifter in defense of one's
property, under both common and statutory law, once a private individual arrested a
purported lawbreaker, the arrestor was required to promptly transport the arrestee to
government authorities. See, e.g., Spencer, 864 F.2d at 1388 (Cummings, J. dissenting);
Hendrix v. Manhattan Beach Dev. Co., 168 N.Y.S. 316, 321 (N.Y. App. Div. 1917); People v.
Ostrosky, 160 N.Y.S. 493, 496 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1916); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 140.40(1).
Accordingly, when looking at the scope of a private person's authority to deprive another
individual of physical liberty, a vast difference exists between the temporary detainment of a
shoplifter whom the store quickly turns over to the police and the confinement and custodial
investigation of the same shoplifter for seventy-two hours. However, if a court characterizes
the question as simply arrest and detainment, that court fails to distinguish between these
two types of deprivations of liberty.
200. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979); Project Release v. Prevost,
722 F2d 960, 973 (2d Cir. 1983).
201. Brakel, Parry & Weiner, supra note 6 at 24. For an illustration as to how the
framing of the issue in this context can impact on the resolution of the issue at hand, see
infra notes 396-406 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court has concluded in the substantive due process
context that the need to avoid arbitrary decision-making by courts
requires courts to characterize rights at issue at "the most specific
level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection
to, the asserted right can be identified."20 2 Such a standard is
appropriate in the substantive due process context since a
resolution of this issue requires a court to examine whether history
and tradition have protected a particular legal right.2°3 While
utilizing an objective, legally specific standard to frame the issue at
hand may help to minimize arbitrary decision-making, in the state
action context, history and tradition are not always particularly
relevant considerations. 2°4 However, since the state action doctrine
aims to determine whether the actions of private individuals
infringe upon a plaintiff's constitutional rights, one can look at the
most specific context at which the Supreme Court has engaged in
constitutional adjudication.
20 5
On the other hand, in the state action context, the Constitution
does not always specifically address the existence of a right for
which a plaintiff seeks constitutional protection.20 6 Furthermore,
when framing the state action issue, the Supreme Court has
frequently looked, not at particular rights, but at particular actions
202. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6. In Michael H, the Supreme Court examined
whether the substantive component of the Due Process Clause protected extra-marital sexual
relations. Id. at 124. This required the Court to frame the conduct for which the plaintiffs
sought protection. In framing the issue as whether or not the law traditionally protected the
exercise of extra-marital sexual activity, the Court concluded that it should not characterize
the action in question as the performance of consensual sexual activity. Rather, principled
constitutional analysis dictated that the Court characterize the conduct at the most specific
level of generality that the law protected or failed to protect. Id. at 127 n.6.
203. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
204. These considerations are relevant when a court applies the public function test.
See infra notes 316-40 and accompanying text. However, when a court applies the other
state action criteria, history and tradition are certainly not as pivotal as they are in
substantive due process analysis.
205. See West, 487 U.S. at 53-54, 56 n.15 (recognizing that the Constitution requires the
provision of minimally adequate medical services to prisoners and distinguishing between the
provision of medical services to prisoners and the provision of medical services in general);
Marsh, 326 U.S. at 508-09 (recognizing that the First Amendment protects the right to
petition on the street comer). Resort to an examination of the relevant constitutional
protection is particularly relevant if one believes that the Constitution completely reserves a
zone of activities to state control. See Chemerinsky, supra note 17 at 542.
206. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (involving provision of




of private defendants. °7 However, the idea of developing a standard
for the framing of activity by a private defendant can help to
eliminate the arbitrary characterization of private actions that can
enable a court to reach any particular result that it wishes to reach
based upon the particular preferences of the judges deciding the
case.
208
It is not easy to set forth a concrete method for characterizing
private activity because plaintiffs have asserted many different
bases for a finding of state action. 2°9 However, when attempting to
characterize the conduct of defendants, one can adhere to the
concept of specificity by looking at the most specific level at which
the law has set limits on the type of conduct in which the
defendants have engaged.
Whether one attempts to frame the state action issue by looking
at the most specific level at which the Supreme Court has engaged
in constitutional adjudication or the most specific level at which
the law has set forth limits on the defendants' conduct, in the civil
conmmitment context, the result is the same. The Supreme Court
has held that the Due Process Clause provides substantive and
procedural protections to subjects of the civil commitment
process.210 On the other hand, historically, courts have addressed
the right of an allegedly ill person to remain free from compulsory
in-patient treatment and have placed limits on an individual's
authority to confine such mentally ill person.211
207. See, e.g., Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 157; Am. Mfrs., 119 S.Ct. at 987.
208. Admittedly, some problems exist with the concept of applying particular levels of
generality to state action analysis. First, two members of the majority in Michael H., Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, have noted that the approach set forth by the majority in Michael H.
will not necessarily be the single mode of constitutional analysis. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Moreover, these justices now believe that when attempting to
define the scope of the substantive component of the Due Process Clause, the mode of
constitutional analysis taken by the majority in Michael H., is "inconsistent with our law."
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992). Secondly, this approach also creates
the potential for arbitrary application when one must determine how one moves from one
level of generality to the next. See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality
in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. Ciu. L REV. 1057, 1090-91 (1990). However, notwithstanding
these concerns, the concept of attempting to define the examined activity of defendants in
the narrowest appropriate context can help eliminate arbitrary decision-making when a court
attempts to frame the state action issue.
209. See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1003-04 (detailing different bases for a possible finding of
state action).
210. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (holding due process
prohibits the confinement of a mentally ill individual who can live safely in the community
with the help of others); Addington, 441 U.S. at 432-33 (requiring clear and convincing
evidentiary standard in commitment hearings).
211. See, e.g., D.A Cox, Annotation, Right, Without Judicial Proceeding, to Arrest and
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Accordingly, whether one chooses to frame the issue by
reference to relevant constitutional rights or by the conduct of the
private wrongdoers, an attempt to frame the issue at hand in the
narrowest and most accurate manner results in the framing of the
issue as follows: whether physicians at private hospitals engage in
state action when they involuntarily confine an allegedly mentally
ill person for compulsory treatment, i.e., when they civilly commit
an allegedly mentally ill individual.
B. The Interrelationship Between Civil Commitment by Private
Physicians and the Policies Underlying the State Action
Doctrine
The application of any legal doctrine to a particular situation
requires an examination of the purposes underlying such doctrine.
Such examination is particularly necessary when addressing the
issue at hand since there has been substantial disagreement among
the courts that have addressed the issue of whether or not civil
commitment is state action. While an examination of the purposes
underlying the state action doctrine does not, in and of itself,
resolve the issue, it is a factor to consider when scrutinizing the
legal framework governing this issue.
The state action doctrine first seeks to ensure "that there is no
'[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority
of state law.' "212 Second, an object of the Constitution "is to permit
citizens to structure their private relations as they choose subject
only to the constraints of statutory or decisional law."218 Hence, the
state action doctrine also seeks to preserve individual freedom by
limiting the reach of federal law.214 The state action doctrine also
avoids imposing responsibility on the state for conduct for which it
Detain one who is, or is Suspected of Being, Mentally Deranged, 92 A.L.R. 2d 570, § 6, at
580-81 (1963) (and cases cited therein).
212. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., v. Air Canada, 727 F.2d 253, 255 (2d
Cir. 1984) (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 929). The goal of protecting against the exercise of
governmental authority by private individuals is relevant to both the abuse of authority
doctrine and cases in which parties act on behalf of the government.
213. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 619.
214. Id. A desire to limit the reach of federal law explains why the Supreme Court
found no state action when a private school discharged teachers in RendeU-Baker, when
debtors and a creditor engaged in a dispute in Flagg Brothers and in Jackson when a
customer of a utility company sought damages because of an allegedly wrongful termination
of services.
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cannot be blamed.215
A finding that individuals who involuntary hospitalize someone at
a private hospital engage in state action is consistent with the
purposes underlying the state action doctrine. No one can seriously
dispute that state law provides physicians with the authority to
commit allegedly mentally ill individuals.2 16 Individuals who have
sued private physicians pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have alleged
that those physicians have abused their state authority by violating
their constitutional rights.217 A finding of state action provides such
individuals with a remedy when physicians have misused authority
granted to them by state law.
218
215. Id. This function of the state action doctrine is rarely implicated. It arises only in
those rare instances, such as in Blum, when plaintiffs seek to hold the government
accountable for the actions of private individuals with whom there is little connection. This
situation must be distinguished from those situations in which government officials act in
tandem with private individuals and there is no dispute that the government officials will be
held accountable for their conduct. See Am. Mfrs., 119 S. Ct. at 985-86.
216. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 9.03 (McKinney 1996 and Supp. 2000)
(prohibiting psychiatric hospitals from admitting patients except pursuant to the provisions
of the state's civil commitment laws); see also Ellison, 48 F.3d at 195 (acknowledging that
state law provides private physicians with authority to confine an allegedly mentally ill
person); S.P., 134 F.3d at 270.
217. See, e.g., Okunieff, 996 F Supp. at 346; Rockwell, 26 F3d at 256.
218. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980) (noting purpose of
§1983 is to provide compensation); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139 (1988). Admittedly, the
common law claim of false imprisonment may provide some protection against any abuse of
authority. However, Congress intended that § 1983 provide a remedy that is independent of
any remedies under state law. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972); Felder, 487
U.S. at 141-43.
Moreover, for a number of reasons, a false imprisonment claim will often fall short of
providing adequate protection for abuse of state authority. First, a mentally ill individual may
seek to enjoin a systemic abuse of state authority by private hospitals or private physicians.
A common law damage remedy may not serve as a vehicle to obtain prospective relief.
Second, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 lawsuit may exceed the limitations period for
a common law claim. See William M. Brooks, Reevaluating Substantive Due Process as a
Source of Protection for Psychiatric Patients to Refuse Drugs, 31 IND. L REv. 937, 941
(1998). Particularly because mentally ill individuals may lack knowledge of their rights, or an
ability to procure legal assistance, the existence of a longer limitations period could result in
a person having a § 1983 claim when he would not have a claim under state law. See Felder,
487 U.S. at 141-42.
Finally, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 authorizes the awarding of attorney's fees to the prevailing party
in a § 1983 action. Many subjects of civil commitment lack the ability to work because of
their illness. Cf. Mental Health Ass'n. of Minn. v. Schweiker, 554 F Supp. 157, 162 (D. Minn.
1982), aB-d., 720 F2d 965 (8th Cir. 1983). Moreover, their confinement may not last for an
extended period of time, particularly if the subject of commitment seeks a judicial hearing to
challenge his hospitalization and a court finds that the subject of commitment did not satisfy
the civil commitment criteria. See, e.g., Okunieff, 996 F Supp. at 347 (noting that state court
directed the release of plaintiff in civil commitment proceeding). Hence, for many individuals
who have been wrongfully confined, the prospect of a large damages award is not
particularly great. These circumstances may limit the ability of someone to obtain legal
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Furthermore, the actions of private physicians or private
hospitals are possible only because the state's civil commitment
laws have authorized physicians to confine allegedly mentally ill
individuals. Without the express authority of state law, physicians
would not be in a position to exercise their medical judgment to
effectuate the involuntary hospitalization of mentally ill
individuals. 19
A finding of state action does not adversely impact upon the
citizens' ability to structure their private relations as they see fit,
subject only to the constraints of statutory or decisional law. If I
choose to teach at a private university, I understand that I may not
have the same level of job protection that I would have if I worked
for a state university.20 Nevertheless, I weigh the comparative
advantages and disadvantages between the two jobs and act as I
see fit.
However, under no circumstances does civil commitment involve
two parties choosing to structure their relationship in a particular
manner. When a private physician certifies a person for
commitment, the mentally ill person is detained and/or transported
to a private hospital and is not given a choice in the matter.21
As one authority has noted, it is not particularly appropriate to
examine the degree of individual liberty preserved because an
increase of liberty for a party to a legal dispute that implicates the
state action doctrine results in a concomitant decrease in liberty
for the other party.222 Accordingly, since the state action doctrine
seeks to preserve individual freedom as a whole, it is appropriate
to resolve any state action question in a way that, to the greatest
extent possible, furthers the concept of liberty for one party to the
legal dispute at hand while not inappropriately limiting the liberty
of the other party. To this extent, it is no doubt useful to examine
the scope of liberty that both sides of the legal dispute have under
common law.
223
The Constitution permits physicians to confine mentally ill
representation. The potential for an award of attorney's fees may make it substantially easier
for someone who has been wrongfully confined to obtain legal assistance to redress abuses
of state authority. Brooks, at 941-42.
219. See infra notes 245-47 and accompanying text (detailing limitations on the power
to confine under common law).
220. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 596-98 (1972).
221. See, e.g., Okunieff, 996 F Supp. at 347; S.P., 134 F3d at 264-65.
222. See Chemerinsky, supra note 17 at 536.
223. Cf. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 162 n.12 (noting that Supreme Court looks to rights of
creditors under common law when resolving state action issue).
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individuals pursuant to state authority under circumstances that the
common law did not. The common law permitted physicians (and
anyone else) to confine a mentally ill person only when the
threatened harm was imminent. Moreover, the Constitution permits
physicians to confine a mentally ill person when the threatened
harm is not immediate and somewhat more remote. 224 On the other
hand, both the Constitution and state law set forth the boundaries
of the authority to civilly commit. Because state commitment laws
broadened the authority of physicians to commit even after such
laws were limited to a degree by the Due Process Clause,225 a
finding that civil commitment does not entail state action
intolerably broadens the liberty of physicians because it eliminates
restrictions against physicians who wish to confine mentally ill
individuals under circumstances not permitted by either the
common law or the Constitution.2 6 For the same reason, a finding
that civil commitment does not entail state action intolerably
diminishes the liberty of those individuals subject to private civil
commitments.
Finally, a finding that civil commitment constitutes state action
does not impose responsibility on a state for conduct for which it
cannot be blamed. Generally, this issue has arisen in the context of
individuals seeking damages from private physicians.227 In these
situations, the plaintiff does not seek to hold the state accountable
224. See infra note 248 and accompanying text
225. See id.
226. Such a result is particularly pernicious because physicians want to treat mentally
ill individuals and have felt frustrated by the limitations on their ability to treat imposed by
the Constitution. See, e.g., Donald Treffert, "Dying with Their Rights On," 139 Am. J. PSYCH.
1041, 1041 (1973). At times, physicians have tried to evade limitations on their ability to treat
imposed by the Constitution. See, e.g., David B.Wexler & Samuel E. Scoville, The
Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13 ARa L REV. 1,
100-01 (1971) (finding that physicians labeled mentally ill individuals as dangerous in order
to further their ability to treat); Edward P. Mulvey & Charles W. Lidz, Back to Basics: A
Critical Analysis of Dangerousness Research in a New Legal Environment, 9 L & HUMAN
BEHAV. 209, 214 (1985) (stating incorrect assessments of dangerousness is a function of
doctors labeling an individual dangerous as a method of ensuring treatment); John Monahan,
The Clinical Prediction of Violent Behavior 51, National Institute of Mental Health
Monograph (1981). Similarly, in looking at physicians' ability to administer medication
notwithstanding court decisions that recognized a right to refuse medication, one prominent
psychiatrist noted that "[n]o matter what the law does, we'll always [d]rug all the people we
want. I hate to say that, but that's my experience. By hook or by crook, most of the patients
will continue to be [drugged]." Sheldon Gelman, The Biological Alteration Cases, 36 Wm. &
MARY L REV. 1203, 1290 n.318 (1995) (quoting Dr. Loren Roth). (or Loren Roth in Conference
report, Refusing Treatment in Mental Health Institutions: Values in Conflict, 32 HosP. &
CommuNrry PSYcHiATRY 255, 257 (1981)).
227. See, e.g., Spencer, 864 F2d at 1377; Okunieff, 996 F Supp. at 346.
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in any way.
However, one can envision a situation in which a plaintiff or
class of plaintiffs seeks to remedy unlawful practices that both
public and private physicians are undertaking.228 Because the ability
of private physicians to provide compulsory in-patient treatment
depends on the authority conferred upon them by state law, the
actions of the state can be deemed to be the proximate cause of
challenged conduct.2 9 In such a situation, the state action doctrine
enables a court to hold private parties accountable in the same
manner that it would hold public entities accountable and imposes
similar constraints on both the state and private parties when
performing a sovereign function.
V. WHY CIVIL COMMITMENT CONSTITUTES STATE ACTION
A. Civil Commitment Entails the Exercise of Coercive State
Authority
The circuit courts that have addressed the state action question
in the civil commitment context have generally applied the
traditional state action tests. ° These courts have failed to
recognize the existence of the "abuse of authority doctrine" that
applies when private individuals have "the weight of the State
behind their private decisions." 1
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has concluded that an individual
acts "under color of" state law, and hence, engages in state action,
when he carries a "badge of authoity and represents the state in
some capacity,"232 or participates in activity that "results from the
228. See, e.g., Monaco v. Stone, No. CV-98-3386 (E.D.N.Y. filed May 4, 1998)
(challenging the manner in which psychiatrists evaluate civil commitment subjects in both
public and private hospitals).
229. Cf. Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep't, 607 F2d 17, 24 (2d Cir. 1979)
(utilizing a "but for" test to determine whether actions of private entity are governmental in
nature).
230. See supra notes 139-81 and accompanying text.
231. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 940.
232. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 191. The Supreme Court has concluded that while conduct
that satisfies the state action requirement also satisfies the under color of law requirement, it
does not follow that conduct that satisfies the under color of law requirement also satisfies
the state action standards. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 935, n.18. However, the Court has cited Lugar
to conclude that "in § 1983 actions the statutory requirement of action 'under color of state
law' is just as broad as the Fourteenth's Amendment's 'state action' requirement." Hafer v.
Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 28 (1991) (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 929). However, the latter language
from Lugar referred to instances when an action was brought against a state official. See
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 929. On the other hand, the former quote referenced instances when a
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State's exercise of 'coercive power.' "m Thus, in what the Court has
characterized as the "usual" state action case, a court must
determine "whether the state provided a mantle of authority that
enhanced the power of the harm-causing individual actor."23
Indeed, a finding of state action as a result of an exercise of state
authority does not fall within one of the four traditional state
action tests. However, an exercise of state authority can be
considered the quintessential basis for a finding of state action
since, when examining the scope of Fourteenth Amendment
protections, the Supreme Court concluded that whether or not the
Constitution protects against certain unlawful activity depends on
whether the wrongdoer exercised state authority: "[c]ivil rights,
such as are guaranteed by the Constitution ... cannot be impaired
by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State authority
in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings.
The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such
litigant sued private officials. See Id. at 935 n.18. However, in a subsequent action involving
the state action status of a private entity, the Court concluded that the under-color-of-law
requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the state action requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment are the same. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 182 n.4. Accordingly, while it is not
completely clear as to whether or not the state action and under color of law requirements
are the same, when a plaintiff sues a private defendant, at the very least, the under color of
law cases serve as very persuasive authority when addressing the state action issue.
233. Brentwood Acad., 121 S. Ct. at 930.
234. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 192. The Court's characterization of those situations in
which a state has provided a mantle of authority as "the usual" state action case is
interesting. Certainly, such a case does not fit within the four traditional tests. The
characterization of such a case as "usual" can mean only that the Court recognizes that in
addition to the four tests, state action exists when a state acts in a coercive manner when
representing the state, including when it "delegates its authority to the private actor." Id. It is
noteworthy that in the cases in which the Supreme Court applied the traditional state action
tests the plaintiffs did not assert that the private defendants exercised state authority. See,
e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (providing utility services); Flagg
Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (involving utilization of self-help remedy by
creditors); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (discharging of medical patients pursuant to
Medicaid law); San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987)
(dealing with conduct and coordination of amateur athletics).
The closest defendants came to exercising state authority in a coercive manner was in
Jackson when a private utility terminated its services. However, the Court concluded that
under state law, the furnishing of utility services was neither a state function nor a
municipal duty. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353. Indeed, the Supreme Court noted in Jackson that
"[i]f we were dealing with the exercise by Metropolitan of some power delegated to it by the
State which is traditionally associated with sovereignty . . . our case would be quite a
different one." Id. at 352-53 (emphasis added). Likewise, the Court's decision in
Rendell-Baker that the provision of education to maladjusted high school students is not
state action is consistent with the Court's pronouncement in Jackson that states did not have
the authority to prohibit the implementation of parochial educational systems by different
religious sects. Id. at 354 n.9.
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authority, is simply a private wrong."1 5 Accordingly, an individual
acts under color of law, and hence, engages in state action, when
he exercises power "'possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority
of state law.'"236 Indeed, as the Supreme Court has recognized, and
the Second Circuit has reiterated, "'[i]f an individual is possessed
of state authority and purports to act under that authority, his
action is state action.' "237
The involuntary commitment of an allegedly mentally ill
individual is an exercise of sovereign power. "Under English law at
the time of the settling of the American colonies, the King had the
authority to act as 'the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and
lunatics.' "2 This authority was known as parens patriae.239 After
the American Revolution, the parens patriae power was vested in
state legislatures. 240 The state's police power, also part of the state's
sovereign authority, is invoked through the civil commitment
process to protect the general public.241 Hence, any confinement by
a private individual is an act that has been delegated by the
sovereign since "[t]he State's power to commit individuals rests on
the inherent attributes of sovereignty and may be traced to two
separate aspects of sovereign authority:" the state's parens patriae
and police powers.
242
Although the tracing of the power to confine a mentally ill
individual forecloses serious discussion about whether the act of
civil commitment is an exercise of state authority, it is instructive
to examine the scope of a person's authority to confine a mentally
ill individual under common law.24 If at common law a party was
235. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) (emphasis added).
236. West, 487 U.S. at 49 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
237. Coleman v. Wagner Coil., 429 F 2d 1120, 1125 (2d Cir. 1970) (quoting Griffin v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 135 (1963) (emphasis in Coleman)); See also Polk County v. Dodson,
454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (concluding that duties of public defender "entailed functions and
obligations in no way dependent on state authority").
238. Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally 1/, 87 HAv. L REv.
1190, 1207 (1974) ("Developments in the Law") (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S.
251, 257 (1972)).
239. Developments in the Law, supra note 238 at 1208.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1222.
242. Brakel, Parry & Weiner, supra note 6 at 24; see also Addington, 441 U.S. at 426
(recognizing civil commitment involves exercise of state's police and parens patriae
powers).
243. See Am. Mfrs., 119 S.Ct. at 988 (concluding that under common law private
insurers could withhold payment pending a determination of the necessity of such treatment
"without any authorization or involvement of the State"); see also Jackson, 419 U.S. at 354
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at liberty to effectuate the involuntary hospitalization of a mentally
ill individual under circumstances not authorized by state law, then
arguably governmental authority is not required for the act of civil
commitment. However, if the government has traditionally placed
limitations on the power to civilly commit, then any such
confinement should be construed as an exercise of state authority.
This is particularly true when, as is the case of civil commitment,
the act of commitment is an exercise of the state's police or parens
patriae power.
244
At common law, absent state authority, neither physicians nor
anyone else could detain a mentally ill individual for a period of
time not authorized by a state's civil commitment laws. At common
law, if someone restrained an allegedly mentally ill person, it would
have been the duty of the restrainer to "at once . . . invoke the
agencies established by law for the care and protection of the
insane, and to institute that proceeding which was required to
authorize her further detention."
245
Moreover, common law authorized an individual to restrain a
mentally ill person only when the mentally ill person was at
immediate risk of suffering injury.246 However, under existing state
commitment laws and the federal Constitution, a person is
committable upon the mere threat of harm, as long as the threat is
substantial.247 Accordingly, under a state's civil commitment laws, a
n.9 (holding that utility company was at liberty to build a business and provide utility
services); Rendel-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840-41 (private school not fundamentally different than
other corporations that contract with the government). In this regard, a determination of
whether the power to engage in a particular activity turns on the meaning of liberty within
the Constitution. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (noting liberty includes the
right to engage in common occupations of life and common law privileges that are essential
to orderly pursuit of happiness).
244. See supra notes 238-41 and accompanying text.
245. Emmerich v. Thorley, 54 N.YS. 791, 794 (N.Y. App. Div. 1898); see also Cox, supra
note 202 at 580-81 (citing, inter alia, Colby v. Jackson, 12 N.H. 526 (1842)) (rejecting
defendant's contention that indefinite private confinement was permissible as long as person
was dangerous; any confinement had to be sanctioned by law).
246. See, e.g., Matter of Josiah Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 123, 125 (Mass. 1845); Emmerich v.
Thorley, 54 N.YS. 791, 794 (N.Y. App. Div. 1898); Warner v. New York, 79 N.E.2d 459, 462
(N.Y 1948); Furrh v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 676 P2d 1141, 1145-46 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (citing
Crawford v. Brown, 151 N.E. 911 (111. 1926)); Appeal of Sleeper, 87 A.2d 115, 120 (Me. 1952);
Stizza v. Essex County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, 40 A.2d 567, 569 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1945); Re Allen, 73 A. 1078 (Vt. 1909). Emmerich illustrates the type of harm
that the common law authorized as the mentally ill person "was actually in the act of
throwing herself out a window to escape fancied pursuers." Warner, 79 N.E.2d at 462.
247. See, e.g., Matter of Jasmer, 447 N.W.2d 192, 195-96 (Minn. 1989); In re Interest of
McDonnell, 427 N.W. 2d 779, 781 (Neb. 1988); In re Carl C., 511 N.YS. 2d 144, 145 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1987); Matter of Harry M., 468 N.YS.2d 359, 363 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); see also Interest
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hospital may confine a person who is not creating an imminent risk
of harm, but who poses a threat of harm in the future.248 Hence,
utilization of a state's civil commitment is state action because it
enables a physician "to assert sovereign authority over any
individual."249
Finally, even if common law authorized private individuals to
detain those deemed mentally ill for extended periods of time, it is
doubtful that such a practice would eliminate the provision of state
authority as a source for finding state action. If an individual
possesses state authority and acts under such authority, "'[ i t is
irrelevant that he might have taken the same action had he acted in
a purely private capacity.' "2t0
Particularly, because the authority to civilly commit is broader
under a state's civil commitment laws than it was under the
common law,251 no one can seriously argue that when a private
physician certifies a person for involuntary hospitalization under a
of J.S., 545 N.W. 2d 145, 147 (N.D. 1996) (concluding risk of harm must be serious).
248. See, e.g., People v. Hager, 625 N.E.2d. 232, 236 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (noting threat of
harm required for commitment need not be imminent); Matter of Albright, 836 P2d 1, 3-5
(Kan. Ct. App. 1992) (same); Hatcher v. Wachtel, 269 S.E. 2d 849, 852 (W. Va. 1980); Seltzer v.
Hogue, 594 N.Y.S.2d 781, 785 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding hospital may confine patient who
is not presently harmful but who may cause harm in the future because of history of
non-compliance with medication).
The present limitations on a physician's ability to involuntarily hospitalize a mentally ill
person are a result of an historical evolution. Originally at common law, mentally ill
individuals were subject to commitment only if they were dangerous. See supra notes 245-46
and accompanying text. However, beginning in the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
states enacted civil commitment statutes that authorized hospitalization to facilitate the
provision of treatment. Albert Deutsch, The Mentally Ill in America 432 (1949). Hence, many
years later when mentally ill individuals began challenging the constitutionality of civil
commitment statutes, courts examined statutes that authorized confinement when a patient
was in need of treatment, whether or not the patient was dangerous. See, e.g., Project
Release v. Prevost, 722 F2d 960, 973 (2d Cir. 1983). Beginning in the 1970s, courts began
invalidating these statutes finding that, at the very least, the Constitution required a finding
of some threat of harm before a mentally ill person could be committed. See Suzuki v. Yuen,
617 F 2d 173, 178 (9th Cir 1980) (concluding commitment was permissible only when danger
is imminent); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F Supp. 439, 450-51 (D. Iowa 1976); Doremus v.
Farrell, 407 F Supp. 509, 514-15 (D. Neb. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 390 (M.D.
Ala 1974) (requiring a finding, for due process purposes, that a mentally ill individual pose a
real and present threat of substantial harm to self or others); Bell v. Wayne County Gen.
Hosp. at Eloise, 384 F Supp. 1085, 1095-96 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F
Supp. 1078, 1084-86 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974),
reinstated and enforced, 379 F Supp. 1376, vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975),
reinstated 413 F Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (holding state may not confine a
non-dangerous individual).
249. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 197.
250. West, 487 U.S. at 56 n.15 (quoting Griffin, 378 U.S. at 135).
251. See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
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state's civil commitment laws, the physician possesses authority
under state law and is acting under that authority. Indeed,
compliance with the Mental Hygiene Law "'is the single means by
which an individual... can be committed and confined against his
will by a private institution.' "2 52 Hence, when a private physician
hospitalizes an allegedly mentally ill person, the physician's conduct
has been made possible only because he exercised this authority
25
and the state has enhanced the power of the "harm-causing"
physician. 25 Accordingly, just as state action existed in West in part
because "the resultant deprivation was caused, in the sense
relevant for state-action inquiry, by the State's exercise of its right
to punish West by incarceration[,12 55 the involuntary hospitalization
of a mentally ill individual is caused by the delegation of the state's
police and parens patriae powers.
Nor can it be argued that the abuse of authority doctrine is
limited to those situations in which public employees exceeded
their authority.25 The Supreme Court in West recognized that when
252. Rubenstein, 790 F Supp. at 405 (quoting Ruffler, 453 F. Supp. at 1070). It was for
this reason in part that these courts concluded that physicians who involuntarily hospitalize
a mentally ill person are state actors.
253. West, 487 U.S. at 49.
254. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 192.
255. West, 487 U.S. at 55.
256. In Tarkanian, when the Court noted that individuals who carry a badge of
authority and act in accordance with such authority engage in state action, the Court cited
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961). Hence, one can argue that this misuse of authority
doctrine applies not to those situations in which private parties act pursuant to government
authority but when a government official exceeds the authority given to him under state law.
This is not correct. Most significantly, when elaborating on this abuse of authority doctrine
in Tarkanian, the court placed substantial reliance upon West, a case in which the
government delegated its authority to a private individual. See infra note 257 and
accompanying text.
One court has concluded that as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Lugar, the
"abuse of authority" doctrine does not apply when a plaintiff challenges the actions of
private parties. Collins v. Womancare, 878 F2d 1145, 1152 (9th Cir. 1989). The court in
Collins reasoned that in Lugar the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who alleges a misuse
of a state statute, but who does not challenge the constitutionality of the statute itself,
asserts that the defendants acted contrary to relevant state policy. Collins, 878 F2d at 1152.
Accordingly, in the civil commitment context, a plaintiff who does not allege that a state's
civil commitment laws are unconstitutional but alleges that private physicians have acted
unlawfully, is, by definition, asserting that the physicians have acted contrary to state policy
since the state policy is concededly lawful. Hence, if one accepts the Ninth Circuit's analysis
of Lugar, then the abuse of authority doctrine does not apply except when a plaintiff alleges
that the private physician acted pursuant to an unconstitutional statute. However, the Ninth
Circuit's analysis of Lugar appears to be overstated.
Lugar involved a defendant acting pursuant to a state's attachment law. See Lugar, 457
U.S. at 525. Such a statute sets forth rights and remedies of two parties to a purely private
commercial dispute. See Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 160. Accordingly, one cannot attribute to
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one becomes clothed with state authority as a result of a
relationship between a private citizen and the state that was
effectuated by state law, the private individual becomes a state
actor.2 57
One cannot argue that the physician in West became clothed with
authority and hence, a state actor, simply because the state paid
him. First, the Court in West expressly rejected the physician's
source of remuneration as a relevant consideration when assessing
the state action status of the physician. 25 Second, in other
contexts, the existence of a financial relationship between the state
and a private party has had no bearing on the state action status of
the private party.
259
Although the Supreme Court found state action in Griffin v.
Maryland,260 a greater indicia of state action exists when private
physicians utilize a state's civil commitment authority. In Griffin, a
private security guard had been deputized as a sheriff under state
law and arrested a number of individuals for trespassing.261 The
security guard had arrested the individuals to effectuate the
amusement park's policy of segregation. 262 The Court found that the
private security guard engaged in state action because he possessed
and exercised state authority.
263
the state acts taken in contravention of state policy governing debtor/creditor transactions.
On the other hand, physicians who civilly commit someone have acted pursuant to a
delegation of a state's police or parens patriae powers. See supra notes 238-41 and
accompanying text. Because private physicians have acted pursuant to a delegation of a
state's police or parens patriae powers and can confine an allegedly mentally ill person a
period of time far longer than they could under common law, private physicians are
individuals "for whom the State is responsible." Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
257. West, 487 U.S. at 55.
258. See Id. at 56 n.15.
259. See Polk County, 454 U.S. at 319; RendeU-Baker, 457 U.S. at 84041. It is of little
consequence that Polk County was the only case in which the Supreme Court has held that a
government employee is not a state actor. In nearly all instances, when a government
employee acts, he or she represents the government.
260. 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
261. Griffin, 378 U.S. at 132 n.1.
262. Id. at 131.
263. Id. at 135. One can argue that Griffin is an outdated case from the Warren Court
whose precedential value is weak and the badge of authority language in Tarkanian is
simply dicta. However, such an assertion ignores the foundation upon which the Supreme
Court built its opinion in West. If the Court wanted, it could have decided the case by
applying the public function test. See Am. Mfrs., 119 S.Ct. at 987-88. Instead, the Court
concluded, at least implicitly, that a determination of state action rested on the conferral of
state authority on the private physician. See West, 487 U.S. at 55-56. Since the Court in West
quoted Griffin with approval, see id. at 56 n.15, it is difficult to assert that Griffin is no
longer good authority.
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There is simply no difference between the government deputizing
a private individual, which resulted in him taking certain coercive
conduct against private individuals, and a state delegating its civil
commitment authority to private physicians. In each case, there is
an authorization of governmental power that has enabled private
individuals to act in instances when it otherwise could not have
acted.26 However, because the State of Maryland did not sanction
discrimination, the deputy sheriff in Griffin used his governmental
authority to further only private interests. When a private physician
uses his state delegated authority to civilly commit an individual,
the physician acts to further the interests of the state.26
264. One can argue that unlike the situation in Griffin, historically, many private
physicians civilly committed individuals. See, e.g., Spencer, 864 F.2d at 1379-81; Rockwell, 26
F.3d at 259. However, while the provision of treatment is arguably relevant when applying
the public function test to the state action context (and this article will demonstrate infra
that it is not), the issue of the provision of treatment has no bearing when examining the
abuse of authority doctrine. See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
265. The following hypothetical situation is more than a little instructive. Because of
fiscal difficulties, a county must lay off forty percent of its police force. The county
legislature directs that all private security guards patrolling shopping malls must patrol a
three-mile radius surrounding the mall in lieu of a fifty percent property tax hike. The
private security firms then assume most of the responsibility previously undertaken by the
county police, including the arrest of suspected lawbreakers. Would anyone doubt that the
county could delegate such responsibilities without the probable cause requirement
governing the actions of the private police officers?
Could the county authorize the private detention of such suspected lawbreakers for a
period of time not to exceed the maximum sentence for any suspected criminal activity? If
the security officers, pursuant to their delegated authority, randomly stopped and searched
cars without any cause to believe there was contraband on board and then found
contraband, could the police detain the occupants of the car up to a week with little sleep in
an attempt to obtain a confession without running afoul of the Constitution?
An application of the four state actions tests leads to a holding that such conduct is not
state action. The private officials have not acted jointly with the county police. See, e.g.,
Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715 (1961). Nor did the county government compel or even encourage the private police to
act in the manner that they did. See, e.g., Okunieff, 996 F. Supp. at 349-52. The public
function test is not satisfied because arrest and detention have not been exclusively reserved
to the states. See, e.g., Id. at 353. Finally, this is not a case where there is such
interdependence between the private party and the government that the close nexus test is
satisfied. See, e.g., Id. at 352-53. However, does anyone doubt that under the authority in
Griffin the provisions of the Fourth and Fourteenth amendments would govern the conduct
of the private police?
In a case similar to this, an inmate filed a § 1983 lawsuit against hospital police who
arrested the plaintiff outside of Columbia Presbyterian Hospital. Temple v. Albert, 719 F.
Supp. 265, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). While the hospital paid the police, they were also designated
"Special Patrolmen" appointed by the New York City Police Commissioner pursuant to the
New York City Administrative Code. Pursuant to the code, these special officers possessed
all the duties the New York City police possessed. Temple, 719 F Supp. at 267. The court
looked to the source of authority, recognized that such authority existed by virtue of a grant
from the state, and held that the special patrolmen were state actors. Id.
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The express delegation of state authority distinguishes
detainment and confinement pursuant to a state's civil commitment
laws from the temporary detainment that exists when private
individuals effectuate the confinement of a person such as when
they make a citizen's arrest.216 In the absence of such authority,
private physicians could not confine mentally ill individuals for the
periods of time that state law now authorizes.2 67 The private
individual who makes a citizens arrest is simply exercising power
under common law that belongs to all citizens.2 Such power is to
be distinguished from instances when the government has
expressly delegated authority to someone and such delegation of
authority has resulted in the conferral of authority that the private
individual would not have possessed except for such delegation of
authority.269 The private citizen who effectuates a citizen's arrest
can be viewed as an "interloper" and should be contrasted with
someone to whom the state has delegated its authority.2 70
The manner in which courts examined the relationship among
state authority, arrest and bail bondsmen further supports the
proposition that the reliance on state authority to detain someone
results in a finding of state action. The courts finding bail
bondsmen engaging in state action have grounded their decisions
on the reliance by the private bail bondsman of an arrest warrant
266. See Davenport v. Saint Mary Hosp., 633 F. Supp. 1228, 1236 (E.D. Pa. 1986)
(concluding that group of individuals become state actors when state gives them "powers
that are traditionally exercised by the state and not possessed by the general citizenry");
Dahl v. Aldn, 630 F2d 277, 281 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding daughter who facilitated commitment
of her father not a state actor because all citizens could apply for the commitment of a
relative).
267. See supra notes 24648 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., Weyandt v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 279 F Supp. 283, 287 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
269. Id. Instructive to this issue is Williams v. U.S., 341 U.S. 97 (1951). In Williams,
the Court held that a private detective who had been vested with the powers of a city police
officer pursuant to city policy had acted under color of law. Williams, 341 U.S. at 99-100.
Evidence established that the private official had acted under the authority of Florida law
and was not acting in the role of a private citizen. Id.
270. See Williams, 341 U.S. at 100. No one can seriously dispute that a private
physician who civilly commits someone acts pursuant to authority granted to him or her and
not as a private citizen. First, a private citizen would have to turn over the mentally ill
person to lawful authorities. See supra note 245 and accompanying text. Second, the
physician acts pursuant to a state policy that integrates public and private mental health
services into one unitary scheme. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text. Pursuant to
this unitary scheme, physicians complete commitment forms promulgated by the State Office
of Mental Health. See, e.g., Okunieff v. Rosenberg, No. 98-7803, Joint Appendix at 368-69.
While the Supreme Court has noted that the use of forms, in and of itself does not convert
the actions of physicians to state action, see Blum, 457 U.S. at 1006-1007, the use of state
forms evinces the public nature of the actions of the committing physicians.
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to support the arrest of a defendant.27' Those courts that have
found that bail bondsmen were not state actors reached their
conclusion on the ground that the bondsmen were not exercising
state authority.
2 72
Somewhat surprisingly, with the exception of Okunieff, none of
the circuit courts that addressed whether civil commitment is state
action addressed the applicability of this strain of state action case
law. The court in Okunieff concluded, without citing any legal
authority, that "[t]he private physician is not exercising
governmental authority when he or she uses medical judgment in
assessing the dangerousness of an individual for commitment
purposes."273 Rather the authority relied upon by the private
physician "is the professional medical standard of the community
where the physicians' medical judgments are based."
27 4
The court in Okunieff could not cite any authority because none
exists. In reaching this conclusion, the court ignored an unyielding
line of cases that recognize that the Constitution sets forth limits
271. See Jackson v. Pantazes, 810 F.2d 426, 429 (4th Cir. 1987) (apprehending fugitive
by bondsman "was exercising powers conferred on him by state law."); Maynard v. Kear, 474
F Supp. 794, 800-03 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (concluding bondsman was a state actor because he
acted pursuant to authority of a judicial bench warrant); Hill v. Toll, 320 F Supp. 185, 187
(E.D. Pa. 1970) (holding bail bondsmen are state actors because they possess privilege to
arrest, which the general citizenry does not possess).
272. See Landry v. A-Able Bonding, Inc., 75 E3d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating
bondsman "did not purport to act pursuant to the [arrest] warrant in any respect"); Ouzts v.
Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F 2d 547, 554 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding none of the defendants
"held any vestige of authority from any state or any political subdivision thereof").
A series of decisions in the procedural due process area further supports this analysis. In
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) the
Supreme Court held that random deprivations of property did not implicate the Due Process
Clause. In so holding, the Court recognized that the State could not be held responsible for
the unauthorized conduct because the deprivation of property is in almost all cases beyond
the control of the state. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541. On the other hand, when state officials at a
state psychiatric hospital acted pursuant to state authority when they deprived a person of
liberty, the Fourteenth Amendment protected the individual because, inter alia, the State
delegated to the hospital officials the authority to effectuate the deprivation about which the
mentally ill person complained and it was foreseeable that the state mental health officials
might abuse their authority. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 135-38 (1990). Hence, the Court
in Parratt and Hudson failed to attribute the conduct of individuals employed by the state to
the state because the state did not authorize such conduct; when the actions of government
employees were authorized, the distinct possibility existed that some officials to whom the
state delegated its authority would abuse this authority and the Court imposed responsibility
on the state. It is no different when the state delegates its sovereign authority to private
physicians. If the authorization to act resulted in the attribution of state responsibility in
Zinermon, then the same attribution of authority must exist when private physicians act
pursuant to the state's delegation of authority and civilly commit mentally ill individuals.
273. Okunieff, 996 F Supp. at 354.
274. Id.
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on a physician's authority to confine a mentally ill person2 5 and an
equally long line of cases that recognize that under the doctrine of
informed consent, any decision pertaining to purportedly necessary
medical care rests with the patient.276 Rather, this article has shown
that the court in Kay v. Benson277 correctly noted that "[the] power
of detention is the type of power normally and historically
exercised by sovereign states and other governmental entities .. .
[The state's commitment statutes] confer upon a physician the
power to do something which he otherwise would not have the
right to do as an individual."
278
The failure of courts to examine the impact of the exercise of
state authority when examining whether or not civil commitment is
state action can be contrasted with those cases in which
government employees engaged in tortious conduct and the
question arose as to whether or not such individuals acted under
color of law. In these cases, whether or not the defendant acted
under color of law invariably depended upon whether or not the
defendants were exercising their government authority. For
instance, in Revene v. Charles Commissioners279 the court refused
to dismiss a complaint filed against the off-duty deputy sheriffs.
The court held that even when off-duty deputy sheriffs retain
authority to conduct police action, "any action purportedly taken
pursuant to this authority would be under color of state law."280
275. See supra notes 5 & 248 and accompanying texts.
276. See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y Hosp., 211 N.Y 125, 129-30 (1914); Pratt v.
Davis, 118 111. App. 161, 166 (1905); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P. 2d 1093, 1103-06 (Kan. 1960);
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780-82 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P. 2d 1, 8-11 (Cal. 1972).
277. 472 F. Supp. 850 (D.N.H. 1979).
278. Kay, 472 F. Supp. at 851.
279. 882 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1989).
280. Revene, 882 F2d at 873; see also Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 493-94 (10th Cir.
1995) (concluding that school custodian who sexually molested student did not act under
color of law because there was no "real nexus" between actions of custodian and misuse of
authority as government employee); Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F3d 809, 816 (3d Cir.
1994) (holding whether or not off-duty police officers exercise official authority determines
whether the officers have acted under color of law); Pitchell v. Callan, 13 E3d 545, 548 (2d
Cir. 1994) (deciding that off-duty police officer who shot another person did not engage in
state action because, inter alia, he did not invoke authority of police department); Martinez
v. Colon, 54 'F3d 980, 987 (1st Cir. 1995) (police officer who accidentally shot fellow officer
did not engage in state action because he "did not exercise, or purport to exercise, any
power (real or pretended) possessed by virtue of state law"); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910
F. 2d 1510, 1518 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that off-duty police officer who was previously
stripped of authority by police department did not act under color of law because "one
cannot misuse power that one no longer possesses"); Poulson v. City of N. Tonawanda, 811
F Supp. 884, 895 (W.D.N.Y 1993) (whether or not a government employee acts under color
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Likewise, when determining whether a police officer engaged in
state action when he shot a fellow officer at the station house, a
court concluded that the "key determinant" was whether the officer
exercised official responsibilities pursuant to state law.28' In a
different but analogous context, in Roby v. Skupien,28 2 a court
found that railroad police employed by private railroad engaged in
state action because "railroad policemen are 'cloaked with
authority of the state.' "283
Finally, one should distinguish between an exercise of state
authority as a result of governmental delegation and the
authorization of private conduct by the government when a private
party is involved in a dispute with another private party in the
private side of the public/private dichotomy.2 4 One authority clearly
delineated this distinction:
"What the state authorizes, the state does" may reflect a
confusion between two senses in which a state can be said to
"authorize" private action: delegation and permission. When
the state authorizes a private. individual to perform some
action on its behalf-when, that is, it delegates the
performance of a government function-constitutional
responsibility for that action rests essentially on agency
principles. But when the state only permits or allows (and, in
that far weaker sense, "authorizes") private individuals to
perform actions on their own behalf, the basis for attributing
such action to the state is, to say the least, obscure.
85
of law when engaging in sexual harassment of a fellow employee depends on whether
harasser has some authority over victim and exercises that authority); Keller v. District of
Columbia, 809 F Supp. 432, 436 (E.D. Va. 1993) (holding that police officers who arrested
individual in another jurisdiction acted under color of law because they appeared to be
exercising authority); Hill v. Barbour, 787 F. Supp. 146, 149 (N.D. 111. 1992) (holding that
off-duty sheriff who shot prowler did not engage in state action after examining whether
sheriff's conduct was related to performance of police duty); Thomas v. Cannon, 751 F. Supp.
763, 768 (N.D. Il. 1990) (city transit worker did not engage in state action when he raped
two minors while on duty since such action was not related to the performance of his job);
Manning v. Jones, 696 F Supp. 1231, 1235 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (deciding that off-duty police
officers acted as private citizens when they engaged in altercation in highway because these
actions were not clothed with authority of state law and police did not exercise
responsibilities pursuant to state law).
281. Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 986 (1st Cir. 1995).
282. 758 F. Supp. 471, 473 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
283. Roby, 758 F. Supp. at 473 (quoting U.S. v. Hoffman, 498 F2d 879, 881 (7th Cir.
1974)).
284. See Am. Mfrs., 119 S.Ct. at 986.
285. Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, The Public-Private Distinction, and
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Accordingly, when state law authorizes a private party to take
certain action that results in another private party suffering a
deprivation of liberty or property, such authorization, in and of
itself, does not constitute state action.286 On the other hand, when a
private individual exercises governmental authority at behest of the
government, he acts on behalf of the state. Hence, when in West,
the Supreme Court noted that an individual engaged in state action
when he exercised power by virtue of state law, such a rule
referenced an exercise of governmental authority that had been
delegated to private individuals.
28 7
Civil commitment is not a private dispute but an exercise of
governmental authority.288 As a result of the doctrine of informed
consent, private physicians have no valid legal interest, proprietary
or otherwise, in involuntarily hospitalizing a mentally ill person
since neither physicians nor hospitals have a right to treat people
who do not consent to treatment.289 The failure to recognize this
blurs the "essential dichotomy" between public and private acts.
29
0
B. A Function of a Doctor who Works at a Private Hospital and
Commits Mentally Ill Individuals is to Serve the Interests of
the State
The Supreme Court has recognized that when a state action
question arises out of actions of the government in its role as
sovereign, a resolution of the state action question depends on the
relationship between the state and a private defendant who has
harmed a plaintiff.291 In these instances, the Supreme Court has
the Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 329, 348-49 (1993) (quoting
Frank I Goodman, Professor Brest on State Action and Liberal Theory, and a Postscript to
Professor Stone, 130 U. PA L REv. 1331, 1338 (1982)) (emphasis by Professor Kay).
286. See Tulsa Prof'l, 485 U.S. at 485 (stating "[p]rivate use of state-sanctioned private
remedies or procedures does not rise to the level of state action"); Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at
362 n.12 (state authorization of private self-help remedy does not warrant a finding of state
action). Hence, simply because the state has "chosen sides" by expanding the rights of one
private party at the expense of another does not mean that the private litigant has exercised
state authority.
287. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 192 (citing West to support the proposition that state
action may occur if state "delegates it authority to the private actor"); West, 487 U.S. at 56
n.15 (noting that employment status of physician to whom state delegated authority is
irrelevant).
288. See supra notes 276-78 and accompanying text; see also Davenport, 633 F. Supp.
at 1236 ("[i]t is obvious that civil commitment statutes do not exist to resolve purely private
disputes").
289. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
291. As detailed infra, in West, the government had incarcerated a convicted defendant
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looked at the "function" of the private defendant to determine
whether or not a private defendant has engaged in state action.
292
Resolution of the Supreme Court's decisions in those cases in
which the Court has taken a functional approach to the state action
question, namely West, Polk County, and, to a lesser extent,
Rendel-Baker, also warrants a finding that the physicians who
civilly commit individuals engage in state action.
In West, the Supreme Court concluded that a doctor who is
under contract with the state to provide medical services in a
prison engages in state action not because the state pays him, but
because of the "relationship among the State, the physician and the
prisoner."293 In so holding, the Court explicitly noted that "the
context in which respondent [physician] performs these services for
the State (quite apart from the source of remuneration)
distinguishes the relationship between respondent and West from
the ordinary physician-patient relationship."294 State action existed
because the doctor helped the state fulfill "its constitutional duty to
provide adequate medical treatment to those in its custody."295 In
sum, a private doctor under contract with the state who works in
prisons fulfills the role of the state in providing medical care.
Two related concerns helped drive the Court's decision in West.
First, the Court did not want a state to evade its constitutional
obligation to provide medical services to prisoners by contracting
with private doctors to provide those services. 296 Second, the Court
did not want a state to deny prisoners a means of vindicating their
constitutional rights by contracting out the provision of medical
services, which the Constitution required the state to provide.
297
and was required to provide medical services to him. In Polk County, the Court examined
the role of a public defender when the state was prosecuting a criminal defendant.
292. Polk County, 454 U.S. at 318.
293. West, 487 U.S. at 56.
294. Id, at 56 n.15 (emphasis added).
295. Id. at 56.
296. Id.
297. .Id. On the surface, this rationale of the Supreme Court appears circular. Because
the Fourteenth Amendment governs actions of state officials, see, e.g., supra note 45 and
accompanying text, one can argue that a prisoner's constitutional rights cease to exist when
a state chooses to have a private party provide medical services. Obviously, the rationale
underlying the holding of West forecloses this contention.
Rather, West, and Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 510 (1946), stand for the proposition that
certain constitutional interests are so basic that a person will not lose them as a result of
circumstances that are beyond the individual's control. Determining just what rights fall
within this protection under West and Marsh is somewhat difficult. The rationale of West and
Marsh suggest that citizens will not lose those rights that the Bill of Rights has specifically
referenced and that the Fourteenth Amendment has incorporated. On the other hand, some
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The relationship between the state, private physician, and inmate
can be contrasted with the relationship between the state and
public defender in Polk County. In that case, the Supreme Court
held that a public defender did not act under color of law when
representing a criminal defendant even though the state paid the
attorney's salary.298 Unlike, the physician in West, the actions of a
public defender when representing an indigent criminal defendant
"entailed functions and obligations in no way dependent on state
authority."299 Rather, a public defender must engage in such actions
as entering not guilty pleas, moving to suppress the state's evidence
and cross-examining adverse witnesses.3°° In sum, the public
defender is in an adverse relationship with the state.
301
Significantly, the Supreme Court in Polk County contrasted the
functions of a public defender with that of a director and physician
constitutional rights exist only because the state has been involved in some activity.
Compare Jackson v. Metro. Edison, 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (holding no constitutional right to
utility service) with Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1978)
(concluding constitutional right to procedural protections when government operated utility
service terminates service).
While the limitations on a state's civil commitment authority fal .between these two types
of rights, such limitations are closer to former type of right. Because, the Constitution
prohibits the confinement of a non-dangerous mentally ill person, see supra note 248, such
right falls within the substantive component of the Due Process Clause "that bars certain
arbitrary, wrongful government actions 'regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to
implement them.'" Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)). The unwillingness of the Supreme Court to generally find
substantive protections, see, e.g., Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992), suggests
the importance of those rights that fit within this component of the Due Process Clause.
More significantly, physical liberty has always been one of the most cherished rights within
this nation's constitutional system. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992)
(suggesting that the right to physical liberty is fundamental); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
452- U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981) (recognizing that physical liberty is different than other
constitutional deprivations and holding that the right to counsel presumptively attaches only
when one's physical liberty is at stake). Accordingly, West and Marsh suggest that the
Supreme Court would look askance at government action that can result in the elimination
of constitutional protections that would otherwise exist but for the government's abdication
of its sovereign role.
298. Polk County, at 319-20.
299. Id. at 318.
300. Id. at 320.
301. See Id at 320-22, 323 n.13. West can be contrasted with Jackson and American
Manufacturers. In Jackson, the Court found that state law did not impose a duty on the
state to provide utility services. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353. In American Manufacturers, state
law did not require the state to provide to injured workers either medical treatment or
workman compensation benefits. Am. Mfrs., 119 S. Ct. at 988. Because there was no
obligation to provide services in Jackson and American Manufacturers, there was no
delegation of sovereign authority, and hence, no need to examine the relationship among the
state, the private defendant who stood in the shoes of the state, and the plaintiff who had
been injured by the actions of the private defendant.
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of a state operated psychiatric hospital.30 2 The functions of a doctor
who involuntarily hospitalizes patients are to "protect the interest
of the public as well as that of his wards."3°3 In other words,
"[i]nstitutional physicians assume an obligation to the mission that
the State, through the institution, attempts to achieve."3°4 If a
physician at a state hospital is a state actor because of his
relationship with the state,305 and not the result of employment or
payment on a contract basis, then one must look at the function of
a private physician who commits a mentally ill person? °6 Through
its civil commitment laws, the State has delegated its authority to
confine individuals to doctors at private hospitals and patients are
hospitalized pursuant to this delegation of authority.
307
The difference between the provision medical services in West
and the constraints imposed upon a physician who civilly commits
mentally ill individuals does not warrant a result different from
West. Civil commitment implicates a component of the Due Process
Clause different than that in West. In West, a duty to provide
medical services existed because the state confined a prisoner, and
such action created an obligation on the part of the state to
provide such services °8 However, there is no duty if the provision
of services is the exception to the general rule that the state need
not provide services to its citizens.3°9 Rather, the Due Process
Clause protects against deliberate "decisions of government
officials to deprive a person of life, liberty or property."310 As such,
the Constitution has been described as a "charter of negative rather
than positive liberties."311 Accordingly, the Constitution clearly
302. Polk County, 454 U.S. at 319-20.
303. Id. at 319 (emphasis added).
304. Id. at 320.
305. Id. at 320-21.
306. Indeed, if a public defender is not an "agent" of the state because she is the state's
adversary (see Brentwood Acad., 121 S. Ct. at 934), then it becomes difficult to imagine how
a private physician who acts on behalf of the state, and only on behalf of the state, is not an
"agent" of the state and hence, a state actor.
307. See supra notes 238-41 and accompanying text. In Rendell-Baker, the Supreme
Court, foreshadowing its analysis in West, was willing to look at the relationship among the
private school teachers, the school itself and the state. Just as in Polk County the
relationship between the public defender and her client was identical to any other
lawyer-client relationship, the relationship between the school and its teachers did not
change because the state paid the tuition of the students. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841.
308. See West, 487 U.S. at 56.
309. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189, 198-99 (1989).
310. Collins, 503 U.S. at 127 n.10 (emphasis added).
311. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983). In characterizing the
Constitution in this manner, the Seventh Circuit noted that "[tihe men who wrote the Bill of
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serves as a source of protection against unlawful decisions to
deprive a person of liberty by means of involuntary
hospitalizationA
12
Hence, from a constitutional standpoint, there is no difference
between an obligation to provide medical services to prisoners and
an obligation not to confine non-dangerous mentally ill
individuals. 31 3 If, as the Supreme Court concluded in West, the state
action doctrine serves to provide citizens with an opportunity to
vindicate their constitutional rights when they have been victimized
by private individuals who have been carrying out a sovereign
function, then it is indefensible to conclude that involuntarily
hospitalizing mentally ill individuals is not state action.A14
Rights were not concerned that government might do too little for the people but that it
might do too much to them. The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868 at the height of
laissez-faire thinldng, sought to protect Americans from oppression by state government, not
to secure them basic governmental services." Id. at 1203.
312. See e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975); see also Rodriguez, 72
F.3d at 1062-63; Demarco v. Sadiker, 897 F Supp. 693, 698-700 (E.D.N.Y 1995).
313. The Court in Okunieff rejected this contention noting that West was
distinguishable because "[tihe State bore an affirmative, constitutional duty to provide
medical treatment to those in custody." Okunieff, 996 F Supp. at 355. However, by limiting
the state's ability to evade constitutional limitations through delegation to private individuals
in only those situations in which there is an obligation of the state to act, the court in
Okunieff ignored the primary purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra note 311
and accompanying text.
314. As one court has noted, to hold that the involuntary hospitalization of a mentally
ill individual does not constitute state action "would allow the state to avoid its
constitutional obligations simply by delegating to private hospitals its responsibilities for the
care of individuals it involuntarily confines." Davenport v. Saint Mary Hosp., 633 F. Supp.
1228, 1234 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
It may well be that the functional approach and abuse of authority standard are flip sides
of the same argument. When applying both standards to the civil commitment context, a
finding of state action exists because the state has delegated its authority to private
individuals who, when acting on behalf of the state, have caused a deprivation of
constitutional rights. See supra notes 251-56 and accompanying text. However, the abuse of
authority doctrine will arise when the private defendant exercises state authority to act in a
coercive manner. This may not be enough to differentiate the two state action theories. I
have chosen to frame these arguments as separate standards because the Supreme Court has
referenced them as such. See, e.g. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 929, 940 (referencing abuse of authority
standard, the Supreme Court fails to mention the functional approach set forth in Polk
County). Other than satisfying academic purists, it may be unnecessary to resolve the
question of whether these standards are really the same since the Supreme Court has
evinced a willingness to leave unanswered the question of whether the Court's different state
action tests "are actually different in operation or simply different ways of characterizing the
necessarily fact-bound inquiry". Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939.
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C. Civil Commitment is an Exercise of a Power Traditionally
Exclusively Reserved to the State
The public function test seeks to determine "whether a private
citizen is doing the state's business and should be treated as an
employee or other formal agent of the state."315 Any determination
of the public function test first requires an analysis of what the
public function standard really means.
The Supreme Court has characterized the public function test in
a number of similar, but slightly different, ways. In initially
formulating this standard in Jackson, the Court first asked whether
the private entity exercised "powers traditionally exclusively
reserved to the State."316 The Court then termed its inquiry as
whether the private entity exercises "power delegated to it by the
State which is traditionally associated with sovereignty."3 17 Finally,
the Court framed its inquiry as whether the private party engaged
in action that was "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the
State."3
18
In Flagg Brothers the Court framed the public function
determination as whether the State has delegated to a private party
"an exclusive prerogative of the sovereign."319 However, the Court
also noted that "[w]hile many functions have been traditionally
performed by governments, very few have been 'exclusively
reserved to the State.'" 32 Recently, the Court looked at whether
the state delegated to private defendants a "traditionally exclusive
governmental function."
321
In the context of civil commitment, the difference between an
exclusive governmental power and exclusive governmental function
is significant. Civil comnitment is an exercise of an exclusive
governmental power.3 22 On the other hand, both the government
and private entities have civilly committed individuals.323 Hence, if
the relevant inquiry becomes whether the government had
exclusively performed civil commitment then one reaches a
different result than if one asks whether civil commitment is an
315. Spencer, 864 F2d at 1380 (en banc).
316. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352 (emphasis added).
317. Id. at 353.
318. Id.
319. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 160.
320. Id. at 158 (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352) (emphasis added).
321. Am. Mfrs., 119 S. Ct. at 988.
322. See supra notes 245-49 and accompanying text.
323. See, e.g., Okunieff, 996 F. Supp. at 355-56.
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exercise of a power traditionally reserved to the government. The
failure of a court to recognize this distinction can result in a court
framing the inquiry as whether private physicians exercised a
traditionally exclusive governmental power and then reaching a
decision by looking at whether the government exclusively
performed the activity of civil commitment.
32 4
It is doubtful that the Supreme Court ever intended to modify the
standard it first enunciated in Jackson. First, in Jackson, the Court
went out of its way to recognize that a difference exists between
exclusive government authority over a particular matter and an
exclusive government function. The Court noted that one function
of government is providing education but the government lacks the
authority to prohibit other groups from providing education to
others.325 Furthermore, in Flagg Brothers, when the Court spoke of
a function, it was clearly distinguishing between the engaging in
private political activity and the power to regulate elections.
326
Moreover, the Court in Jackson cited Evans v. Newton,327 when it
examined the jurisprudential landscape from which the public
function evolved.3 28 In Evans, the court concluded, "when private
individuals or groups are endowed by the government with powers
or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or
instrumentalities of the State and subject to its constitutional
limitations.
"32
A reading of Jackson strongly suggests that the Court intended
its definition of the public function test to constitute a synthesis of
its previous public function cases. If this is the case, one can
assume the relevant inquiry is whether civil commitment is an
exercise of a prerogative that has been traditionally exclusively
reserved to the government.
Prerogative means "a sovereign right inhering in a state."m
Indeed, one court has recognized that "'[o]ne of the paradigmatic
means by which a private party becomes subject to section 1983 is
through the government's conferral upon that party of what is, at
core, sovereign power.'"aa In other words, a determination of
324. See Rockwell, 26 F3d at 258-60; Okunieff, 996 F Supp. at 353-56.
325. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 354 n.9.
326. See Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 158.
327. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
328. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352.
329. Evans, 382 U.S. at 299 (emphasis added).
330. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcIoNARY 1791 (1981).
331. Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F3d 337, 342 (4th Cir. 2000)
(quoting United Auto Workers v. Gaston Festivals, Inc., 43 F3d 902, 906 (4th Cir. 1995)).
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whether the government has conferred upon a private party its
sovereign power is another way of examining whether the function
performed is an exclusive prerogative of the state.32 As detailed
earlier, the confinement of a mentally ill person beyond the briefest
period of time is a power that has been exclusively reserved to the
government.m
The need to distinguish between an exclusive sovereign power
and the exercise of such power by private individuals can be
evinced in a comparison between civil commitment state action
cases and both election and fire protection state action cases.
Courts that have found civil commitment is not an exclusive
governmental prerogative detailed how, historically, private
hospitals treated mentally ill individuals.33 In other words, these
courts focused on whether private entities performed the activity of
providing in-patient care and treatment to mentally ill individuals.
On the other hand, in Jackson, the Supreme Court examined
previous state action cases and concluded that state action was
present in primary elections involving private entities because the
elections "involved powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the
State."33 In finding that the actions of private political parties
constituted state action, the Supreme Court noted that private
primary elections are conducted by private political parties under
state statutory authority. In addition, state courts are given
exclusive jurisdiction over contested elections, state statutes
imposed duties on the political parties and "the duties do not
become matters of private law because they are performed by a
political party."3 Under the Supreme Court's analysis, the process
332. Goldstein, 218 E3d at 342.
333. See supra notes 245-49 and accompanying text.
334. See Okunieff, 996 F. Supp. at 356-57; Rockwell, 26 F3d at 259-60; Spencer, 864 F2d
at 1380-81.
335. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352 (emphasis added).
336. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944) (emphasis added); see also Rockefeller
v. Powers, 74 F.3d 1367, 1375 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that state's "delegation to the various
parties of the right to nominate candidates for special elections renders the party selection
process state action").
The need to distinguish between an exclusive state power and an exclusive function can
also be evinced in the area of prosecutions. One court has concluded that because private
prosecutors "have been used in a variety of settings and jurisdictions in this country...[t]he
prosecutorial function is not, therefore, the exclusive prerogative of the state." Rochez v.
Mittleton, 839 F. Supp. 1075, 1081 (S.D.N.Y 1993). However, it is clear that the government
retains authority over prosecutions by private parties. See Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils
S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 808-09 (1987) (per Justice Brennan with three Justices concurring and one
Justice concurring in judgment); State of New Jersey v. Imperiale, 773 F. Supp. 747, 752-53
(D.N.J. 1991). Accordingly, no one can seriously dispute that any private prosecution would
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involving involuntary hospitalization parallels that of the election
process. Private physicians can hospitalize patients only under state
statutory authority, state courts determine whether or not patients
satisfy the statutory requirements for commitment,3 7 and state
statutes and regulations impose duties on the committing hospitals
in areas ranging from treatment to the assumption of primary
responsibility for emergency psychiatric admissions.ms
Likewise, in finding that a volunteer fire department is a state
actor, the Second Circuit did not look at whether the activity of
fire protection has been performed exclusively by government
officials. Rather, the court recognized that resolution of this
question required a determination of whether "the function is one
which is traditionally within the exclusive province of
government."3 9 A volunteer fire department was a state actor
because fire protection "is sufficiently 'associated with
sovereignty.' "340
be subject to constitutional constraints. See Imperiale, 773 F. Supp. at 754-55. Such
constraints would not be necessary if private prosecutors were not state actors.
337. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 9.31 (McKinney 1996).
338. For example, in New York, the state Office of Mental Health must plan and work
with, inter alia, local governments and public and private providers of psychiatric services,
including general hospitals, "to develop an effective, integrated, comprehensive system for
the delivery of all services to the mentally ill." N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw §§ 1.03(5), 7.01.
Likewise, under state law, private hospitals must obtain an operating certificate in order to
provide psychiatric services. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 31.02. As a condition of renewal of an
operating certificate, a private hospital must agree to service a catchment, i.e., geographic,
area for involuntary psychiatric admissions pursuant to New York Mental Hygiene Law §§
9.39 and 9.40.
Finally, state law authorizes the state Office of Mental Health to set "standards of quality
and adequacy of facilities, equipment, personnel, services, records, and programs for the
rendering of services pursuant to an operating certificate." N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §
31.04(a)(2). State regulations contain detailed standards that govern, inter alia, the transfer
of patients from one hospital to another, 14 NYCRR Part 517, the rights of patients in all
licensed hospitals, 14 NYCRR Part 527, the operation of psychiatric wards in general
hospitals, 14 NYCRR Part 580, and the operation of comprehensive psychiatric emergency
programs. 14 NYCRR Part 590.
339. Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep't, 607 F2d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 1979).
340. Janusaitis, 607 F2d at 23 (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353). In reaching this
conclusion, the court further examined how state law impacted the operations and actions of
the volunteer fire department. State law authorized a fire department officer to direct any
person to leave any building in the vicinity of a fire and inspect state owned buildings within
its jurisdiction. Id. at 24. Accordingly, state law recognized that fire fighting was "essentially
the exclusive function of the government, but a function which may be delegated to a
volunteer group." Id. (emphasis added); see also Goldstein, 218 F.3d at 345 (holding
volunteer fire department a state actor because, inter alia, state delegated to fire
department "incidents of sovereignty" related to fire fighting).
One can arguably assert that in some instances, application of the functional approach
taken by the Court in West and the public function test produce identical analysis and
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In finding that civil commitment has not been an exclusive public
function some courts have cited nineteenth century laws that
authorized private physicians to certify a mentally ill person for a
specific period of days.41' However, these courts should have been
asldng whether this was a power traditionally associated with
sovereignty and whether these physicians could have acted in the
same manner in the absence of state law. It is noteworthy that
when applying the public function test in other contexts, courts
that have found state action have concluded that the private
defendants assumed powers traditionally belonging to the state.34
2
results. Any power exclusively reserved to the state confers upon the state a role in a
particular governmental area, e.g., adherence to societal norms through the use of the state's
prosecutorial powers. Accordingly, if a private party has exercised a power that has been
traditionally reserved to, although not necessarily performed by, the state, then the private
party has acted on behalf of the state. Indeed, while the Supreme Court never mentioned the
public function test when it decided West, subsequently, the Court recognized that "the State
was constitutionally obligated to provide medical treatment to injured inmates" and
characterized this provision of treatment as a "traditionally exclusive public function." Am.
Mfrs., 119 S.Ct. at 987-88.
However, the functional approach necessarily involves an examination of whether the
private defendant is acting on behalf of the state. See West, 487 U.S. at 56, Polk County, 454
U.S. at 320. On the other hand, while the functional approach focuses on the relationship
among the state, plaintiff and private defendant, the public function test simply looks at the
activity in question. For instance, some courts have applied the public function test to
conclude that volunteer fire fighters are state actors. See, e.g., Mark v. Borough of Hatboro,
51 E3d 1137, 114147 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 165 (1995); Janusaitis, 607 E2d
at 21-24 (2d Cir. 1979). Other courts have held that they are not. See, e.g., Yeager v. City of
McGregor, 980 F. 2d 337, 340-41 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 79 (1993). A finding of
state action can lead to new found constitutional protections, such as concluding that the
First Amendment protects speech of the volunteer fire fighters. See Janusaitis, 607 F2d at
25. On the other hand, a finding that volunteer fire fighters are not state actors can result in
fire companies conducting administrative searches in the absence of lawful authority and
victims of such searches having no redress under the Constitution.
In this regard, application of the public function test differs from the abuse of authority
standard. The abuse of authority standard serves as a check on official power when the
government has delegated sovereign authority to individuals who, when acting on behalf of
the state, have exercised this delegation to deprive individuals of a constitutionally protected
right. On the other hand, the public function test can be utilized by those who exercise
sovereign authority, such as volunteer fire fighters, when they believe that the organization
for which they work has deprived them of rights protected by the Constitution. Certainly,
action is far more attributable to the state when a person suffers a deprivation of rights that
results from an exercise of state authority that had been delegated to private individuals
than when an individual suffers a deprivation following a delegation of a sovereign
prerogative but which is unrelated to any such delegation, e.g., when physicians who have
the power to civilly commit individuals allege that their own rights have been violated when
they have been fired from their job at a private hospital.
341. Okunieff, 996 F Supp. at 356; Rockwell, 26 F.3d at 259; Spencer, 864 E2d at 1380.
342. See, e.g., Warner v. Grand County, 57 F.3d 962, 964 (10th Cir. 1995) (concluding
individual who engaged in strip search exercised power traditionally reserved to the state);
Rodrigues v. Furtado, 950 F2d 805, 814 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding vaginal search of criminal
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An examination of the evolution of the public function test
further illustrates why a court should focus on exclusivity of power
and not exclusivity of performance. The modem public function
test became crystallized in Jackson and Flagg Brothers when the
Supreme Court emphasized the necessity of exclusivity.4 In laying
out the requirement of exclusivity, the Court in Flagg Brothers
acknowledged the existence of two lines of state action cases:
those involving the conduct of elections, and municipal function
cases involving Marsh and its progeny.344 Both lines of cases had
"in common the feature of exclusivity."345 While the Supreme Court
never explained why exclusivity is a necessary component of the
public function doctrine, it is useful to try to understand the
purpose underlying the exclusivity requirement.
The state action doctrine can be viewed as an attempt to
maximize individual freedom in situations in which it is often
difficult to determine how to maximize liberty346 It does so by
recognizing that the Constitution aims to permit individuals to
structure their relationships with a minimum of interference from
the government.347 Accordingly, the state action doctrine will not
protect an individual when he or she consensually enters into a
relationship with another private party.348 On the other hand, the
Constitution guarantees certain individual rights and when an
individual loses constitutional protection through no fault of his
own, the state action doctrine will provide protection for the
individual.349
The concept of exclusivity protects individual rights when
through no choice of her own, a person finds herself in an
arrangement in which she has lost the opportunity to develop
relationships in a way that will ensure the protection of individual
rights. In Marsh, the aggrieved individuals did not have the ability
to exercise their First Amendment rights within their community
defendant amounted to an exercise of "the power of search traditionally reserved exclusively
to the State").
343. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352-53; Fagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 157-60.
344. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 157-59.
345. Id. at 159.
346. See Chemerinsky, supra note 17 at 536.
347. Cf. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 619.
348. See, e.g., Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 160 (involving commercial transaction between
two private parties); RendeU-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841 (dealing with employment dispute
between private school and its teachers).
349. See West, 487 U.S. at 56.
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because a private company owned the entire town.350 On the other
hand, those who sought to exercise their First Amendment rights in
Hudgens v. NLRB3 51 had ample opportunity to exercise their rights
in the community in which they lived. Likewise, particularly
because the resolution of primary elections determined the winner
of the general elections, actions that resulted in the loss of a
citizen's vote in the primary necessitated a finding of state action in
order to ensure that the citizen could meaningfully participate in
the electoral process.
35 2
Once one recognizes that the concept of exclusivity serves to
ensure that those individuals who desire can structure their
relationships in a way that maximizes constitutional rights, it
becomes that much clearer that civil commitment satisfies the
public function test. Just as prisoners in West could not choose
their own medical coverage,35 and the petitioners in Marsh had
little opportunity to exercise their First Amendment rights on a
street comer, a person subject to involuntary hospitalization has
not chosen to enter into an arrangement with the physicians who
have hospitalized him.
35
350. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502-03
351. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
352. See Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 158 (interpreting state action election cases as turning
on the dispositive nature of primary elections).
353. West, 487 U.S. at 55.
354. Indeed, if exclusivity is important because it relates to the opportunity for citizens
to vindicate their constitutional rights, then the problems that exist when a court examines
whether the government exclusively performed a function, as opposed to examining whether
the activity in question was an exercise of an exclusive government authority, become that
much more apparent. To illustrate, in Okunieff the court concluded that civil commitment
did not satisfy the public function test because, inter alia, a private facility, New York
Hospital, was one of the first institutions to provide in-patient care. Okunieff, 996 E Supp. at
356. Leaving aside for the moment the issue of coercion, perhaps in Westchester County,
where New York Hospital was located, the government did not exclusively perform the
function of providing in-patient care to the mentally ill. However, what about in the rest of
the state? The availability of one private hospital does not mean that individuals around the
rest of the state had the opportunity to choose between a public and private facility when
choosing psychiatric care for either themselves or relatives in need. In Marsh, the local
community served as the relevant geographic entity for determining whether a citizen could
exercise constitutional rights. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 507-08. If for one hundred years only the
government provided in-patient psychiatric care in Buffalo does the existence of a private
hospital in Westchester mean that the provision of in-patient care is nevertheless to be
considered a function that is not exclusively governmental?
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D. Civil Commitment Constitutes State Action Because the State
Has Created the Legal Framework Governing Civil Com-
mitment Decisions
The Supreme Court has recognized that when "the government
'has create[d] the legal framework governing the [challenged]
conduct' . . . it involves itself 'in a significant way' with the
unlawful conduct."355  Likewise, the Supreme Court has also
concluded that its own state action jurisprudence also suggests
"that the private party's challenged decisions could satisfy the
state-action requirement if they were made on the basis of some
rule of decision for which the State is responsible."356
In the civil commitment context, the state has created a rule of
decision that physicians must follow. State law significantly limits
the discretion of committing physicians. First, both state law and
the Constitution prohibit the confinement of a non-dangerous,
mentally ill person. 57 On the other hand, state law imposes a duty
of care on all psychiatrists who in their professional judgment
believe a mentally ill person is dangerous-and a doctor is liable if
he releases a patient whom he knew or should have known was
dangerous.3t s Hence, an examining physician who believes a patient
355. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 624 (quoting Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 192 ("challenged"
bracketed in original)).
356. West, 487 U.S. at 52 n.10; see also Catanzano By Catanzano v. Dowling, 60 F.3d
113, 119 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding private home health care agencies engage in state action
because, inter alia, agencies made decisions to terminate services pursuant to legal
standards).
357. See supra note 248 (detailing cases that recognize that Constitution prohibits
confinement of mentally ill individual who is not dangerous); Brakel, Parry & Weiner, supra
note 6 at 101-05 (setting forth statutory schemes requiring finding of danger as a
pre-requisite for commitment). Statements made by the New York State Office of Mental
Health when it modified the civil commitment forms that physicians were required to
complete when they involuntary hospitalized someone illustrate how the psychiatric
community recognizes the obligation to conform clinical decisions to legal standards. In
circulating new commitment forms in 1989, the Office of Mental Health noted that these
forms "mark the culmination of an effort to make the forms consistent with current law."
Okunieff v. Rosenberg, No. 98-7803, Joint Appendix at 363. Specifically, "the standard for
involuntary hospitalization . .. has been amended to conform with judicial rulings in recent
years which have required a showing of 'dangerousness.'" Id. at 364.
358. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 127 N.E.2d 545, 549 (N.Y 1955) (stating "[sItate has
frequently been liable for the consequences of its breach of duty to protect others from the
acts of the mentally ill confined to State institutions"); Durflinger v. Artiles, 673 P.2d 86, 93-94
(Kan. 1983); Davis v. Lhim, 335 N.W.2d 481, 488 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); Lipari v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 191 (D. Neb. 1980); Rattray v. State, 636 N.Y.S.2d 43, 44
(N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Dunn v. State, 312 N.YS.2d 61, 64 (N.Y App. Div. 1970). These cases
involved instances when clinical staff did not continue to confine mentally ill individuals
whom they should have known were dangerous. In researching this article, I was unable to
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is dangerous must commit the patient.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court's decision in Blum means that
not every decision made pursuant to a statute amounts to state
action. In Blum, residents of a private nursing home who were
Medicaid recipients asserted that decisions to discharge them or
place them on a lower level of care violated their procedural due
process rights. The Court rejected this contention holding that the
employees of the private nursing homes were not state actors.
In Blum, federal law required physicians to certify that patients
were receiving "medically necessary services."39 However, other
than requiring that the services be medically necessary, federal law
left the decision to discharge patients or lower their services to the
discretion of the physician.36  Hence, the decisions of the
physicians were framed in accordance with canons of professional
ethics and not "dictated by any rule of conduct imposed by the
State." 61 Therefore, the existence of a statute that results in actions
being taken by private officials is merely the starting point for any
state action analysis. Unlike the situation in Blum in which
discretion is left to the physician, in the civil commitment context,
decisions to confine or not to confme rest on a determination of
dangerousness, a standard imposed by the Constitution and which
has been further interpreted and refined by courts.3
2
uncover even one case in which a clinician chose to either release or not to continue to
confine a mentally ill person whom the clinician believed was dangerous. The complete
absence of such a case evinces an understanding on the part of clinicians that they must
confine any mentally ill individual whom they believe is dangerous.
359. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1005-06 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396).
360. Id. at 1006 n.16.
361. Id. at 1009.
362. No one can seriously dispute that if state law prohibits the civil commitment of
individuals unless they are dangerous, then physicians who certify individuals for
commitment under a state's mental health laws are bound by how state courts define
dangerousness. While the volume of case law defining what constitutes dangerousness does
not come close to case law defining some elements in the criminal law, such as probable
cause, there is some case law that further limits the discretion of committing physicians. See,
e.g., In re Bates, 734 N.E.2d 459 (111. App. Ct. 2000); Singletary v. State, 765 So. 2d 180 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2000); T.G. v. State, 7 S.W.3d 248 (Tex. App. 1999); Interest of Breeden, 4 S.W.
3d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Dwight J. v. Carmichael, 651 N.YS.2d 434 (N.Y App. Div.
1996); Charles T. v. Sanchez, 626 N.Y.S. 2d 492 (N.Y App. Div. 1995); Naila Y v. Sanchez, 626
N.Y.S.2d 153 (N.Y App. Div. 1995); Campbell v. State, 912 S.W.2d 446 (Ark. Ct. App. 1995);
State v. Sea, 904 P.2d 182 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); Matter of McGaughey, 536 N.W.2d 621 (Minn.
1995); Seltzer v. Hogue, 594 N.YS. 2d 781 (N.Y App. Div. 1989); In re Carl C., 511 N.YS. 2d
144 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
Vol. 40:1
Private Civil Commitment and State Action
VI. THE ILLEGITIMACY OF SPENCER V. LEE AND THE CHAIN REACTION IT
PRODUCED IN STATE ACTION JURISPRUDENCE
Some legal authorities view judges as neutral arbiters who
blindly apply legal principles regardless of the parties involved.363
However, more cynical authorities believe that courts base their
decisions as to who wins a case upon a range of nonlegal factor
that include class animus, political bias and the morality of the
judges.36 Under this view, "[t]he law is a major vehicle for the
maintenance of existing social and power relations."3 5 Even
Benjamin Cardozo recognized that judges must make value choices
and possess "subconscious loyalties" to those groups in which they
are a part.
366
In assessing the legitimacy of a judicial decision, it is assumed
that a decision is justified only if reached through legal reasoning
in which a court assesses all relevant factors that by themselves
generate a particular outcome.367 This is not to say that a mistake
in adjudication is an example that a judge acted in a lawless
fashion.36 s However, there are a number of clues that one can rely
on when determining whether an erroneous decision is a court
making an error when attempting to act in a neutral manner or a
desire to reach a particular outcome in order to effectuate the
judges' personal preferences. Does a court set forth legal
propositions and yet cannot cite any authority for such
statements?3 9 How strained is the legal reasoning that the court
363. See, e.g., Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Hv. L REv. 353,
370-71, 394-95 (1978).
364. See Franklin G. Snyder, Nomos, Narrative, and Adjudication: Toward a
Jurisgenetic Theory of Law, 40 WM. & MARY L REV. 1623, 1651 (1999); see also Edward
Rubin & Malcom Feeley, Creating Legal Doctrine, 69 S. CAL L REV. 1989, 2003 (1996)
(noting attitudes of federal judges may reflect the ideology of society's dominant elite).
365. David Kairys, "Introduction," in Politics of Law, p. 5; see also Paul D. Carrington,
Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUc. 222, 226-27 (1984).
366. William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion and "The Progress of the Law," 10
CARDozo L REV. 3, 4-5 (1988).
367. See Joseph W Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94
YALE LJ. 1, 30 (1984).
368. Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L REV. 739, 748 (1982).
369. Cf. David A.J. Richards, Rules, Policies, and Neutral Principles: The Search for
Legitimacy in Common Law and Constitutional Adjudication, 11 G. L REV. 1069, 1102
(1977) (recognizing that courts should base their decisions on principles reflected in previous
cases and applicable to the case at hand). Such judicial decision-maling is particularly
pernicious because an assertion in a judicial opinion unsupported by any legal authority can
subsequently serve as authority for another court; one that is attempting to act in a neutral
manner. For an example of how the first federal appellate court that held that civil
commitment is not state action, the Seventh Circuit in Spencer, set forth a legal principle
2001
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attempts to rely on to support its holding? Does the court make
errors in reasoning for which there can be honest disagreement or
does a court make errors that are simply indefensible? 370 Does a
court make characterizations about governing authority that simply
is not true? Is a court willing to ignore or mischaracterize existing
precedent?
371
Moreover, in the state action context, one must look at what
bases for state action there were that were simply not addressed.
Ordinarily when deciding a legal question, a court is confronted
with a number of competing legal norms.372 In these instances, a
court must choose the one that is most applicable in order to
resolve the issue at hand.37 3 This is not the case in the state action
area since a court does not need to choose the most applicable
state action test. If under four state action tests, there is no state
action; a finding of state action is nevertheless warranted if a fifth
state action test is satisfied. Hence, it is not a question of what is
the most applicable legal theory, but whether state action exists
under any legal theory.
A detailed analysis of Spencer, the first federal appellate court
case to hold that civil commitment is not state action, reveals that
this decision was so filled with errors in legal reasoning and was
otherwise so disingenuous and intellectually dishonest that one
cannot help to conclude that the judges who ruled in favor of the
private physician-defendants wanted to find for the private
defendants and then looked for justification to support their
holding. Regrettably, this case ignited a chain reaction in which
Spencer and its progeny served as authority for one circuit court
after another to hold that private physicians who involuntarily
hospitalize physicians are not state actors.
When the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided
Spencer, numerous courts had already addressed the issue facing
the court. However, in the first paragraph of the court's opinion,
without citing any authority and such a principle became authority for another court, see
supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text and note 176.
370. For instance, does a court misstate precedent in attempting to justify an opinion.
371. See Karl lewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 85 (1960). By
precedent I do not necessarily mean binding precedent since technically, when an appeals
court decides a case of first impression in its circuit there is no binding precedent. However,
when a court decides a case of first impression in its jurisdiction, and numerous courts have
decided identical issues, one would expect that the court would acknowledge the existence
of such cases and explain why it agrees or disagrees with such decisions.
372. See Snyder, supra note 364 at 1655-56.
373. Id. at 1656.
Vol. 40:1
Private Civil Commitment and State Action
the court took steps that enabled it to issue an opinion that failed
to address the correctness of, or even cite, any of the previously
decided cases. At this time, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit had already decided Burch. One could have expected that
the court would have either adopted Burch as authority to hold
that civil commitment constitutes state action or explain why the
Eleventh Circuit erred. The Seventh Circuit did neither. Rather, in
what can be characterized as an act of judicial dishonesty, the
court concluded that the Eleventh Circuit in Burch "devoted only
three sentences to the issue and cited no authority for its
conclusion."
374
This assertion was simply not true. Rather, in framing the
contours of state action analysis, the court in Burch methodically
relied on Supreme Court jurisprudence.37 5 The court then concluded
that the actions of the private defendants were fairly attributable to
the state because "only by being clothed with the authority of state
law did the appellees possess the power to commit a person to a
mental institution if that person provided voluntary, express and
informed consent."376 While the court did not cite authority for this
statement at the end of the sentence, two pages earlier the court
cited the Florida law from which the court reached this
conclusion.37 7 While the court failed to cite authority for the
proposition that a private citizen could not confine a mentally ill
person for 152 days, as the defendants in Burch did, such a
contention was unquestionably correct.3 8
Having disposed of Burch, the Seventh Circuit attempted to
further justify its holding by noting that "[t]he other courts that
have addressed this issue agree with our position."379 For support
of this proposition, the court cited only Hall v. Quillen30 "and
374. Spencer, 864 F.2d at 1377.
375. See Burch, 840 F2d at 803. The court cited RendeU-Baker to conclude that the
state action issue requires a determination of whether the actions of the private defendants
are "fairly attributable" to the state. Id. The court then reasoned that a deprivation is "fairly
attributable" to the state "when the claim of a constitutional deprivation is directed against a
party whose official character is such as to lend the weight of the State to his decisions." Id.
The court then relied on Supreme Court authority and held that "'[mlisuse of power,
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed
with the authority of state law' constitute[d] state action for the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 929).
376. Id.
377. See Id. at 801 (citing RA STAT. ANN. § 394.463(1)(d) (1981)).
378. See supra note 245.
379. Spencer, 864 F2d at 1377.
380. 631 F2d 1154 (4th Cir. 1980).
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cases cited there."381 However, Hall addressed an issue significantly
different than what the courts in Spencer and Burch addressed. In
Hall, an involuntarily hospitalized individual sued his lawyer, the
judge who conunitted him, and a physician whom the court
appointed to examine him in connection with the court hearing in
which the plaintiff challenged his confinement.382 Accordingly, the
issue in Hall was not whether physicians who civilly commit a
mentally ill individual engage in state action but "whether a
state-appointed counsel or physician can be liable under section
1983 ... or, otherwise stated, is the representation by the counsel
and the action of the physician in such a situation state action?"m
Obviously, this was not the issue that confronted the court in
Spencer. Furthermore, the cases cited in Hall did not address the
issue of whether civil commitment constitutes state action but, as
two of the dissenters in Spencer recognized, whether
court-appointed counsel engaged in state action in the
representation of the client.
3s5
The court acted at the very least disingenuously when it cited
Dahl v. Akin386 and when it asserted that the Fifth Circuit reached
the same conclusion that the court in Spencer did after a woman
invoked her state's civil commitment laws to institutionalize her
father.3 7 The court in Dahl recognized that the daughter lacked the
authority to effectuate the commitment by herself and grounded its
381. Spencer, 864 F2d at 1377.
382. Hall, 631 F2d at 1145. On appeal, the plaintiff recognized that the doctrine of
judicial immunity afforded complete immunity to the judge. Id. at 1155.
383. Id. at 1155.
384. The court's opinion in Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) highlights the
differences in the two cases. A court appointed attorney does not engage in state action in
his representation of the client because the "assignment entailed functions and obligations in
no way dependent on state authority." Id. at 318. Accordingly, court-appointed counsel serves
a role that is antagonistic to the state. See Id. 318-19. On the other hand, physicians who
commit acts pursuant to state authority, see supra notes 238-41 and accompanying text,
fulfill the aims of the state. See Id. at 319-20.
The court in Halt did not treat the court appointed physician differently than the lawyer.
However, like the lawyer, the physician was "appointed by the court to render professional
services to [the] plaintiff." Hall, 631 F2d at 1156 (Winter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). Accordingly, the court-appointed physician was not acting on behalf of the state in any
way.
385. See Spencer, 864 F2d at 1384 (Rippple, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia, Jackson
v. Salon, 614 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir 1980); Housand v. Heiman, 594 E2d 923, 925-26 (2d Cir.
1979); U.S. ex. rel. Simmons v. Zibilich, 542 F2d 259, 261 (5th Cir. 1976); Harkins v. Eldridge,
505 E2d 802, 803 (8th Cir. 1974). In this regard, Halt, was far more akin to Polk County than
it was to Spencer.
386. 630 F2d 277 (5th Cir. 1980).
387. Spencer, 864 F.2d at 1381.
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holding on the fact that the state did not confer upon the daughter
any state authority.m
Not only did Hall and Dahl address issues different than the
issue that faced the court in Spencer, but the court in Spencer
committed additional error when it concluded that "[t]he other
courts that have addressed this issue agree with our position." 9 At
the time the court decided Spencer, the courts in Plain v.
Flicker,9° Brown v. Jenson,391 Kay v. Benson,392 and Ruffler v.
Phelps Memorial Hospital393 had concluded that physicians who
involuntarily hospitalize an individual engage in state action.394 Nor
could the court claim ignorance of these cases since one of the
dissenting opinions in Spencer cited Willacy, Plain and
Davenport.
395
Having eliminated the need to confront existing, adverse
authority, the Seventh Circuit was then able to write on a clean
slate. The court first rejected the plaintiff's contention that civil
commitment was akin to an arrest and therefore state action.
396
Ignoring the difference between a temporary deprivation of liberty,
and the potentially long-term confinement that results when the
388. Dahl, 630 F2d at 281.
389. Spencer, 864 F2d at 1377.
390. 645 F. Supp. 898, 908 (D.N.J. 1986).
391. 572 F Supp. 193, 197 n.1 (D. Colo. 1983).
392. 472 F Supp. 850, 851 (D.N.H. 1979).
393. 453 F. Supp. 1062, 1068-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
394. Likewise, by this time, the courts in Willacy v. Lewis, 598 F Supp. 346, 349
(D.D.C. 1984), and Davenport v. Saint Mary Hosp., 633 F. Supp. 1228, 1237 (E.D. Pa. 1986),
had strongly suggested that civil commitment constitutes state action. In supporting its
finding that civil commitment does not constitute state action, the Seventh Circuit
recognized that Blackstone, writing in 1765, noted that in England individuals confined their
mentally ill friends and relatives. Spencer, 864 F.2d at 1381. There is a certain absurdity to
the court citing practices that occurred in England before the Untied States even became a
country while ignoring recent federal court jurisprudence that addressed the identical issue
at hand.
395. Spencer, 864 F2d at 1388-92 (Cummings, J. dissenting). To further justify its
holding, the majority in Spencer noted that it was adhering to its decisions in Duzynski v.
Nosal, 324 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1963) and Byrne v. Kysar, 347 F .2d 734 (7th Cir. 1965). The
court's reliance on these opinions evinces a desire to rely on any authority, regardless of the
merits of the authority, to justify a holding. Not only was Duzynski and Byrne decided
before any of the modem Supreme Court state action cases, but Duzynski also failed to cite
any Supreme Court state action authority. Rather, the court relied on Spampinato v. Breger,
270 F2d 46 (2d Cir.1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 944 (1960), in which the court held that a
physician employed by a New York City hospital was not a state actor. See Duzynski, 324
F2d at 928-31. Likewise, the physicians who certified the plaintiff for hospitalization in
Byrne were either court appointed and entitled to judicial immunity or employed by the City
of Chicago. See Byrne, 347 E2d at 736.
396. Spencer, 864 F.2d at 1380.
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police arrest someone,39 7 the court then reasoned that individuals
who affect a citizen's arrest are not state actors,398 and "[a]rrest has
never been an exclusively governmental function."
399
Once the court reached this conclusion, the court was then able
to conclude that "[n]ot all state-authorized coercion is
governmental action."4°° By so reasoning, the court was then able
to conclude that "a private comnmitment is no more state action
than a citizen's arrest, the repossession of chattels, or the
ejectment of trespassers is."
401
Such a statement trivializes a mentally ill person's liberty and has
no basis in law or logic. Civil conmmitment involves the exercise of
the state's police or parens patriae powers that results in the
deprivation of liberty for an extended period of time.42 The
repossession of chattels is a remedy for a dispute between two
private individuals that involves a creditor seizing the property of a
debtor. Likewise, the ejectment of trespassers involves a party with
lawful title to land forcibly removing those on the property.4°3 In
fact, only coercion is the common denominator between these two
private remedies and civil commitment. Similarly, a citizen's arrest
often involves a private party detaining someone in the protection
of property until the police come. Furthermore, even in those
397. See supra note 199.
398. Spencer, 864 F2d at 1380.
399. Id.
400. Id.
40L Id. at 1381. Thus, the court equated the involuntary hospitalization of a mentally
ill person with the repossession of goods from a defaulting debtor and concluded that the
involuntary hospitalization by private parties constituted strong evidence that civil
commitment did not constitute an exclusive public function. Id. In so noting, the court a
committed a number of errors.
First, the court erred by equivocating between the concepts of exclusive prerogative and
exclusive function. While the court initially recognized that certain powers are the exclusive
prerogative of the state, the court subsequently concluded that state action did not exist
because historically, the care of the mentally ill was not the exclusive function of the state.
Id. at 1379-81. Furthermore, even if a private party historically engaged in certain conduct,
such activity does not mean the actions of the private individual do not amount to state
action. Rather, as the Supreme Court recognized in Fagg Brothers and American
Manufacturers, the relevant inquiry is whether common law authorized the conduct engaged
in by the private defendants. See Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 162 n. 12; Am. Mfrs., 119 S.Ct. at
988.
402. See supra notes 238-41 and accompanying text and 247-48 and accompanying text.
403. As one court noted, "[clivil commitment statutes are, however, of an entirely
different nature from the commercial self-help statutes at issue in Lugar and Flagg Brothers.
It is obvious that civil commitment statutes do not exist to resolve purely private disputes."
Davenport, 633 F Supp. at 1236; see also Willacy, 598 F Supp. at 349 (physician who certifies
a patient for hospitalization does not avail himself of a self-help remedy but instead
exercises the state's power).
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instances in which an arresting private party detains someone, the
arrestor must promptly turn the arrestee over to the police.
4°4
The majority also failed to distinguish between those private
individuals who may have to immediately intervene to prevent a
mentally ill person from causing harm and private physicians whom
the state has authorized to confine a mentally ill person.
405
However, a significant difference exists between a private
individual who, without the grant of authority from the state, takes
steps to facilitate the confinement of a mentally ill individual, and
the physician, who confines pursuant to state authority.
406
The illegitimacy of the court's opinion can be further evinced by
the statement that "[i]f Spencer thinks the eight days allowed by
Illinois law for confinement prior to hearing is too much, he can
challenge the constitutionality of the statute."40 7 However, if the
Constitution does not govern the certification of mentally ill
individuals by private physicians, then a person who believes that
he is aggrieved by a statute that authorizes his confinement would
lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of any applicable
law.
Finally, the failure of the majority to address any of the
contentions of the dissenters is noteworthy. The dissenting opinions
clearly explained why the majority misstated the holding of Hall
and why the majority's analogy of civil commitment to a citizen's
arrest was wrong.4°8 However, the majority made no attempt to
explain why any portion of the dissenting opinions was wrong. The
failure of the majority to take issue with any aspect of the
dissenting opinions is particularly noteworthy because the
dissenting opinions argued that under the abuse of authority




Moreover, if any legal theory supports a finding of state action, a
court must find state action. The failure of the majority to address
the merits of either the abuse of authority doctrine or the holdings
of numerous district courts that civil commitment constitutes state
404. See supra note 199; see also Spencer, 864 F2d at 1389 (Cummings, J. dissenting).
405. Spencer, 864 F.2d at 1381. The court noted that "[t]he reasons for private
commitment, as for self-defense, citizen's arrests, and other private remedies, are intensely
practical. If a person displays symptoms of acute and violent mental illness, his family or
physician-in an appropriate case a passerby or other stranger-may have to act immediately to
restrain him from harming himself or others." Id.
406. See Pino, 75 F.3d at 1465; Okunieff, 996 F. Supp. at 357.
407. Spencer, 864 F.2d at 1381.
408. See Id. at 1384 (Ripple, J., dissenting); Id. at 1388-89 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
409. See Id. at 1385 (Ripple, J., dissenting); Id. at 1388, 1391 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
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action is inexplicable unless one is willing to conclude that the
court had a predisposition to find in favor of the
defendant-physicians and then attempted to write an opinion to
support what it wanted to hold.
410
Judge Richard Posner, who wrote the majority opinion in
Spencer, has recognized the potential for, and has warned against,
judges injecting their "personal values" when engaging in
constitutional adjudication.411 Regrettably, it is hard not to conclude
that the opinion in Spencer was a product of the personal values of
Judge Posner and the rest of the majority. Thus, the court
employed the state action doctrine in a way that other courts have
done previously, to protect a privileged class, in this case
physicians, against claims brought by a relatively powerless citizen,
one who suffered from mental illness.
4 12
In Harvey, the Eleventh Circuit became the next federal
appellate court to address the state action issue. The court first
eliminated the necessity of addressing the abuse of authority
doctrine by noting that the Eleventh Circuit recognized three state
action tests: the public function test, the state compulsion test and
the nexus/joint action test.413 The court then relied on Spencer and
Watkins v. Roche414 to conclude that state law neither compelled
nor encouraged commitments. 415 The court then held that the state
and private parties possessed co-extensive powers to commit, and
hence, civil commitment was not a function exclusively reserved to
the state.
416
One would expect that confronted with a holding from the
Seventh Circuit in Spencer and a holding from its own circuit it
410. It is interesting to note that while the majority failed to examine whether the
abuse of authority doctrine served as a basis for finding state action, one year later in
Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510 (7th Cir. 1990), two of the judges in the majority in
Spencer, judges Posner and Kanne, recognized the applicability of the abuse of authority
doctrine to a state action determination when the court in Gibson concluded that a police
officer who had been stripped of authority by the city police department was not a state
actor because he no longer possessed governmental authority. Gibson, 910 F.2d at 1518.
411. Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential
Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup'. CT. REV. 1, 22, 25.
412. See Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v.
Brooks, 130 U. PA. L REv. 1296, 1330 (1982).
413. Harvey, 949 F2d at 1130.
414. 529 F Supp. 327 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
415. Harvey, 949 F2d at 1130-31.
416. Id. at 1131. The court disagreed with the holding of Ruffler v. Phelps Memorial
Hospital, 453 F Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y 1978) on the ground that the court failed to determine
whether the commitment function was an exclusive governmental function. Harvey, 949 F2d
at 1131 n.10.
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Burch, the Eleventh Circuit would have believed that Burch
controlled. It did not. The court rejected Burch as controlling
authority by noting that the private defendants had asserted that it
was an arm of the state, which meant that the parties had agreed
that civil conunitment constitutes state action.417 The court cited a
dissenting opinion in Burch to hold that the court "'assume[d]
here that Burch was involuntarily institutionalized by persons
acting under color of state law.'"418 However, it was only the
dissenters in Burch who "assumed" that the defendants in that case
had acted under color of law.
419
Even if the opinion in Burch did not constitute binding
precedent, one would have expected the panel in Harvey to
address whether or not the court in Burch was correct when it
adopted the abuse of authority doctrine. The court in Harvey did
not.
It is also troubling that the court failed to address the wisdom of
those district court cases that held that civil commitment is state
action. While it is understandable that the court would have first
looked to a district court opinion in its circuit when deciding a
question of law for which the court believed there was no binding
precedent, it is highly questionable that the court did not at least
address the substantial district court authority that differed from
Watkins. This is particularly true since a number of district courts
had relied on the abuse of authority doctrine,420 the same rationale
adopted by the circuit court in Burch.
The Eleventh Circuit's opinion, particularly in light of the court's
rejection of Burch clearly shifted the direction of case law. Once
two circuits held that civil commitment is not state action, the
substantial district court authority to the contrary became less
important. The Third Circuit became the next court of appeals to
hold that civil commitment does not constitute state action when it
affirmed without opinion a district court decision.4 1 The district
court had concluded that it found "the exhaustive analysis of the
Seventh Circuit in Spencer, . . . finding involuntarily commitment
not to be a traditional state function convincing."
422
417. Id. at 1132.
418. Id. (quoting Burch, 840 F2d at 810 (Tioflat, J. dissenting)) (emphasis in Harvey).
419. See Burch, 840 F.2d at 810 (Tjoflat, J. dissenting).
420. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
421. Janicsko v. Pelman, 970 F 2d 899 (3d Cir. 1992), aff'g without opinion 774 F.
Supp. 331 (M.D. Pa. 1991).
422. Janicsko, 774 F. Supp. at 336 n.5. Here, the court rejected the decision of a sister
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The First Circuit in Rockwell became the next court of appeals to
follow the new trend begun by the court in Spencer. Like the
courts in Spencer and Harvey the court did not apply the abuse of
authority doctrine. 42 Instead, the court applied the state
compulsion, nexus/joint action and public function tests. 424 In
finding for the private defendants, the court relied on both Spencer
and Harvey.
425
In Ellison, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit became the
next court to hold that civil commitment does not constitute state
action. In Ellison, the court relied extensively on the previously
decided circuit cases to justify its holding.4 26 However, unlike the
other circuits, the court addressed the applicability of West and
promptly completely misread the case. The court held that "[f]or
obvious reasons" West did not control because the defendants in
Ellison were not "contractually bound to the state."427 The court's
interpretation of West was clearly wrong. The Supreme Court in
West explicitly held that state action was present because of the
authority conferred upon the physician to satisfy the state's
constitutional mission to provide medical care to those in custody
and not because of the contractual relationship between the
physician and the state.
428
Spencer and Harvey served as a basis for the Tenth's Circuit's
holding in Pino that the physician who certified a mentally ill
person for involuntary hospitalization was not a state actor.429 The
district court in Davenport v. Saint Mary Hospital, 633 F. Supp. 1228 (E.D.Pa. 1986). The
court correctly concluded that the decision in Davenport served as dictum only and the
court had concluded that civil commitment could be considered a traditional function of the
state. Janicsko, 774 F. Supp. at 336 n.5. However, the court in Davenport had based its
decision in part of the abuse of authority doctrine. Davenport, 633 F Supp. at 1237 (stating
"[c]ourts have held that when the state gives a select individual or group powers that are not
traditionally exercised by the state and not possessed by the general citizenry, a person
exercising these powers is clothed with the authority of state law") (internal quotes omitted).
The district court in Janicsko, like the courts in Spencer and Harvey did not address the
merits of this state action theory.
423. The court had no excuse for ignoring this doctrine because the appellant called it
to the court's attention. See Rockwell v. Cape Cod Hosp., Brief of Appellant at 37.
424. Rockwell, 26 E3d at 25860.
425. Id. at 258.
426. Ellison, 48 F3d at 195-96. The court relied on Rockwell and Spencer to conclude
that civil commitment is not the exclusive prerogative of the state. Id. The court then relied
on Janicsko to conclude that state law does not compel commitments. Id. at 196.
427. Id. at 197.
428. See West, 487 U.S. at 56; see also Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 627 (recognizing that
physician's function within the state system and not terms of employment served as the
basis for the Court's holding in West).
429. Pino, 75 F3d at 1466-67.
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court relied on Spencer and Harvey to conclude that state law
neither compelled nor encouraged physicians to execute
commitment certificates. 30
The chain of legal dominos continued to fall when the court in
S.P held in the same manner as its sister circuits. Spencer, Harvey,
and Janicsko all served as authority for the court's rationale that
the state's commitment laws neither compelled nor encouraged
commitments.4 1
The basis for the Second Circuit's holding in Okunieff, that
private physicians who execute commitment certificates are not
state actors, was somewhat unclear because the court summarily
noted that it based its decision "substantially" on the same reasons
given by the district court. 2 However, one can assume that the
court adopted much of the district court's opinion.
The district court in Okunieff relied on Rockwell, Harvey, and
Janicsko to reason that the state's civil commitment laws neither
compelled nor encouraged hospitalization.4 The court then relied
on Rockwell and Harvey to conclude that civil commitment does
not satisfy the close nexus/joint action test.4 The court then relied
in part of Spencer and Rockwell to conclude that civil commitment
did not satisfy the public function standard.4
However, in its analysis of the public function test, the court
addressed numerous other arguments asserted by the plaintiff. The
court first rejected the plaintiff's assertion that Edmonson served
430. Id.
431. S.P., 134 F.3d at 270. The court rejected the patient's contention that state law
mandated commitments if certain statutory criteria were satisfied. Id. The court
acknowledged that state law provided that a hospital and physician "shall" commence
treatment upon the finding of certain statutory criteria. Id. at 270 n.8. However, even though
the Supreme Court recently held that "shall" generally means "must" it could also mean
"should" or "may." Although the court did not attempt to determine when "shall" should be
construed as a mandatory or precatory. Rather, the court reasoned, without citing any
legislative history, that the legislature intended to protect the individual, i.e., the mentally ill
person, and the public, and not to coerce commitment. Id. However, it stands to reason that
even if the legislature wanted to protect the individual and the public, the only way to do so
would be to provide treatment. Obviously, if a mentally ill person would not voluntarily
accept treatment, then coercion becomes necessary.
432. Okunieff, 166 F3d at 508.
433. Okunieff, 996 F Supp. at 349.
434. Id. at 352. In applying the state action criteria in the manner that it did, the Court
appeared to merge two state action tests. The close nexus test is distinct from the joint
action test, compare Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) with Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144 (1970). Whether or not the state has provided such encouragement or coercive
power as to a private party as to create state action is part of the nexus test. See Blum, 457
U.S. at 1004.
435. Okunieff, 996 F. Supp. at 355.
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as a finding of state action because Edmonson did not contain the
exclusivity requirement.4 6  Rather, the court concluded that
Edmonson adopted the exclusivity requirement because "'the
peremptory challenge has no utility outside the jury system, a
system which the government alone administers.' "4 This is not
correct.
In Leesville, the Court eschewed reliance on any particular state
action test. Rather, the Court extracted a number of principles
from previous state action litigation concluded that its precedents
required an examination of the following: (1) the extent to which
the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits; (2)
whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental
function; and, (3) whether the injury caused is aggravated in unique
way by the incidents of governmental authority.4 The Court
concluded that the government alone administers the jury system
when examining the extent to which private litigants relied on
governmental assistance. 3 9 The Court did not turn its attention to
the second criteria, the traditional governmental function test, until
two pages later in its opinion. At such time, the Court did not
mention exclusivity at all." ° Significantly, just as the government
alone administers the jury system, the government alone
administers the state's civil commitment system.441
436. Id. at 353.
437. Id. (quoting Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 622) (emphasis in Okunieff).
438. Leesvile, 500 U.S. at 621-22.
439. Id. at 622.
440. See id. at 624. The district court's opinion would have been more soundly based it
if had cited the portion of the Supreme Court opinion that addressed the public function
aspect of the opinion when the Court noted that a jury is an entity "that is a quintessential
governmental body, having no attributes of a private actor." Id. However, the Supreme Court,
at least sub silento, recognized the governmental prerogative/function distinction by noting
that a jury exercises the power of the government. Id. Even though the government may
delegate some portion of its authority to private litigants, such delegation "does not change
the governmental character of the power exercised." Id. at 626. Accordingly, when a state
confers its authority on a private body, the private body must adhere to constitutional
constraints. See id. at 625 (stating "[i]f a government confers on a private body the power to
choose the government's employees or officials, the private body will be bound by the
constitutional mandate of race neutrality").
441. Cf. supra notes 238-42 and accompanying text. In this regard, the court erred
further when it rejected Rubenstein v. Benedictine Hospital, 790 F Supp. 396 (N.D.N.Y.
1992) as persuasive authority. In Rubenstein the court asked rhetorically, "[i]f the State is
not providing the authority to deny an individual his liberty what is providing the authority?"
Rubenstein, 790 F Supp. at 406 (quoting Plain v. Flicker, 645 F. Supp. 898, 905 (D.N.J. 1986)).
The court in Okunieff answered this question, without citing any authority, by asserting that
the professional medical standard of the community where the physician is based serves as
the authority. Such an assertion is clearly incorrect. See supra notes 275-78 and
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The court in Okunieff sought to distinguish West by noting that
the patient in West "was not free to consult a physician of his
choosing."442 However, such an attempt to distinguish West borders
on the preposterous, particularly when one recognizes that the
state action doctrine serves to facilitate the structuring of private
relationships as individuals desire."3 Just as the prisoner in West
had no say in the provision of his medical care, neither does a
mentally ill person whom private physicians seize and then
hospitalize.""
The decision in Bass continued the trend of the circuit courts. In
that case, the court relied on Spencer to hold that civil commitment
did not satisfy the public function test and the state compulsion
test because the state commitment statutes "neither encouraged
nor required the commitment of mentally ill individuals.""
5
Recently, the Ninth Circuit bucked the trend of its sister circuits
when the court in Jensen held that a private physician engaged in
state action when he detained a mentally ill person for psychiatric
evaluation."" Like the court in Okunieff, the court applied a hybrid
close nexus/joint action test." 7 The court reasoned that a deeply
intertwined process of evaluating and detaining individuals existed
between the county and the private medical practice with which
the committing physician was affiliated."" While this case is more
akin to Moore than any other civil commitment state action case,
and the court noted that "this case falls between lines drawn in
other jurisdictions,"" 9 the court left itself open for criticism by not
directly distinguishing its case from the substantial circuit
precedent holding otherwise.
Would a different holding by the court in Spencer have resulted
in the other circuit courts holding that civil commitment constitutes
accompanying text.
442. Okunieff, 996 F Supp. at 355.
443. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
444. The court in Okunieff also distinguished West on the ground that because the
prisoner relied entirely on the state for the provision of medical care, health care in prisons
is the exclusive prerogative of the state. Okunieff, 996 F. Supp. at 355. While this is an
accurate interpretation of West, see Am. Mfrs., 119 S. Ct. at 987-88 (1999), the court in
Okunieff did not go far enough in its analysis and failed to examine the interrelationship
between the functional approach taken by the Supreme Court in West and the public
function doctrine. See supra note 340.
445. Bass, 180 F.3d at 243; see Spencer, 864 F2d at 1379.
446. Jensen, 222 F.3d at 574.





state action? If one is willing to conclude that in most cases the
personal biases of judges do not completely corrupt the
decision-making process, then ample reason exists to believe that a
different holding by Spencer would have resulted in different
holdings by the other circuit courts. If Spencer had been decided
differently, then when the Eleventh Circuit decided Harvey there
would have been one circuit court and numerous district courts
holding that civil commitment constitutes state action, together
with an Eleventh Circuit opinion reaching the same conclusion in
dicta. It would have been difficult for the court to depart from such
a line of authority. Just as Spencer and Harvey created a domino
effect in one direction, more likely than not, if these cases had
been decided differently, the other circuits, relying on these cases,
also would have decided the other cases differently.
VII. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF FINDING THAT CrVL COMMITMENT DOES
NOT CONSTITUTE STATE ACTION
A failure to reexamine the circuit court holdings that physicians
who certify mentally ill individuals for civil commitment are not
state actors will result in the elimination of constitutional
protections on a scale perhaps unheard of to date.41° The latest
figures published by the federal government detail that in 1994
while state and county psychiatric hospitals operated 81,911 beds,
private psychiatric hospitals operated 42, 399 beds.451 Furthermore,
there were also 52,948 beds maintained by non-federal general
hospitals with separate psychiatric facilities.452
The numbers in New York State alone illustrate the critical role
of private facilities in the operation of the state's civil commitment
scheme. These are 123 psychiatric units at general hospitals and 13
private psychiatric hospitals in the state providing 5,315 and 1,315
beds respectfully for mentally ill individuals.45 When one
recognizes that general hospitals are designed to provide acute
care,4M which means that stays are short and patient turnover is
450. One can argue that individuals who have been confined by the actions of private
physicians did not have constitutional protections in the first place. However, West counsels
otherwise. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
451. Center for Mental Health Services, Mental Health, United States, 1998.
Manderscheid, R.W., and Henderson, M.J. eds. at 146 (1998).
452. Id. This figure includes beds operated by public and private general hospitals.
453. Statewide Comprehensive Plan, supra note 25, at 13.
454. See id. at 30.
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rapid,45 it becomes clear that many thousands of mentally ill
individuals are civilly committed annually by private hospitals just
in New York State alone.
In addition to the elimination of constitutional protection for
thousands of mentally ill individuals, a determination that civil
conunitment does not constitute state action can create some
rather anomalous situations. What if a court finds declares
unconstitutional certain provisions of a state's mental health laws
on substantive due process grounds, i.e., because the law
authorizes confinement under circumstances that the constitutional
does not permit, such as when a patient is not dangerous?45 Does
a court issue a decree that grants relief only to only those
individuals confined in government operated facilities?
In New York, courts recognized" that the non-emergency
provisions of the state's civil comnitment law violate the
Fourteenth Amendment because they authorize the confinement of
a non-dangerous mentally ill person.4 7 However, while this finding
has resulted in courts interpreting the provisions of the statute in a
constitutional manner,45 the state legislature has never amended
the statute in question, Mental Hygiene Law, section 9.27. Because
the law authorizing the confinement of a non-dangerous mentally ill
person remains on the books, does this mean that physicians at
private hospitals can continue to certify patients for commitment
who are not dangerous?
A finding that civil commitment does not constitute state action
also calls into doubt any constitutional protection relating to
treatment and the right to remain free from harm. As a result of
the Supreme Court's decision in Youngberg v. Romeo,459 it is well
recognized that the Constitution affords civilly committed
individuals the right to at least minimally adequate treatment and
the right to remain free from harm.460 Likewise, civilly committed
individuals possess a liberty interest in refusing medication that
enables these individuals to refuse anti-psychotic medication under
455. See id. at 66.
456. See, e.g., supra note 248.
457. In re Scopes, 398 N.Y.S.2d 911, 913 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977); In re Harry M., 468
N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
458. See, e.g., In re Carl C., 511 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
459. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
460. See, e.g., Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 1996); Estate of Porter
by Nelson v. Illinois, 36 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 1994); Shaw by Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F2d
1135, 1143, 1144-47 (3d Cir. 1990).
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certain circumstances. 461 However, if private physicians who
commit mentally ill individuals to private facilities are not state
actors, then little basis exists for concluding that the physicians
who provide treatment to those same individuals are state actors.
One can argue that, at least in some instances, the provision of
treatment and the forced administration of treatment differ from
the act of involuntarily hospitalizing a mentally ill individual in that
once hospitalized, a mentally ill individual can request a court
hearing to challenge his confmement.462 Arguably, once a state
court judge confirms the decision of a committing physician that a
person satisfies the civil commitment criteria; one can argue that
the state has sufficiently injected itself into the commitment
process as to become a joint participant in the commitment.
4
6 If
this is the case, does this mean, on the one hand, that the
Constitution governs treatment decisions pertaining to a patient
who requests a court hearing and is found to satisfy the civil
commitment criteria, but, on the other hand, does not govern the
treatment decisions of a patient on the same ward who has not
judicially challenged his confinement?
It may well be that at least some of the judges who concluded
that civil commitment does not constitute state action have simply
viewed their decision as a determination that a wrongfully confined
mentally ill individual cannot seek damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§1983.464 However, as seen, such a holding has ramifications well
beyond any determination of the scope of a remedy for someone
who believes that he or she has been wrongfully confined.
CONCLUSION
Prior to 1989, the clear trend among federal courts had been to
find that civil commitment by private physicians to a private
461. E.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299-304 (1982); Rennie v. Klein, 720 E2d 266,
269 (3d Cir. 1983); Project Release v. Prevost, 722 E2d 960, 979-81 (2d Cir. 1983).
Antipsychotic drugs are powerful mind-altering drugs, known as major tranquilizers that
produce numerous long-term debilitating side effects. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 218, at
945-51.
462. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 9.31 (McKinney 1996).
463. This is so because if state law requires that a court release a patient who does not,,
satisfy the civil commitment criteria, then once a patient requests a court hearing to
challenge her confinement, then a private hospital can confine a mentally ill person only
when a court specifically authorizes such confinement. In this manner, the state and the
private facility have effectuated the commitment in tandem.
464. See Spencer, 864 F.2d at 1381 (suggesting that a mentally ill individual confined to
a private hospital can challenge commitment procedures that he believes violate the
Constitution).
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psychiatric hospital constituted state action. However, once the
Seventh Circuit in Spencer held otherwise, the federal judiciary,
particularly the circuit courts, have followed the holding in
Spencer. These courts have ignored the abuse of authority doctrine,
treating it as if it did not exist, as well as the Supreme Court's
decision in West. Just as significantly, these courts failed to
recognize the unprincipled nature of the majority opinion in
Spencer, an opinion that almost had to be so if it was going to
buck the trend of the existing case law at that time as well as
existing Supreme Court state action jurisprudence. Unless the
Supreme Court decides to address this issue and correct the errors
of the circuit courts, or the circuit courts are willing to reexamine
recent precedent, thousands of mentally ill individuals will, in this
age of privatization, lose constitutional protections simply as the
result of a fortuity of being civilly committed to private psychiatric
hospitals.

